

APPEARANCES:

COMMISSION MEMBERS:
Steven A. Ramos, Chairman
Adrianne L. Slash
Holli Harrington
Alpha Blackburn (via telephone)
James W. Jackson (via telephone)

INDIANA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION
By Doneisha Posey, Deputy Director Indiana Government Center North 100 North Senate Avenue, Room N300 Indianapolis, Indiana 46204

On behalf of the Commission.

OTHER COMMISSION STAFF PRESENT:
Caroline Stephens Ryker
Michael C. Healy
Dustin Dyer
Anehita Eromosele

ALSO PRESENT:
Joseph C. Pettygrove
Rob Hicks
Yufen He
Terry Lymon
Cynthia Hahn, Interpreter (via telephone) Develan Bland
1:15 o'clock p.m. October 18, 2019
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I call to order the public meeting of the Indiana Civil Rights Commission. It is October 18th, 2019, and my watch says 1:15 in the afternoon. Following the agenda, we do have a quorum, and I'd like the announcement of the agenda, Judge Ryker.
JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: Okay. So, we have the approval of previous meeting minutes, and those are in the binders for you. The ICRC's Director Report, which we'll need to move further down the agenda, as Doneisha Posey, your Deputy Director, is running late. There is a number of Old Business issues, the first of which are seven appeals that need to be reported back by the Commissioners.
There are some New Business issues as well. One is the appointment of the Commissioners to appeals made of the Director's findings. There are also a few ALJ decisions and orders for the Commission's review was well. There are three on the agenda, one of which was a
matter also on the agenda at the last Commission meeting, and another which is Lymon versus UAW Local Union, which is on the agenda for oral arguments.

We do have some meetings dates for 2019 to finish out the year. There is a period for announcements as well as public comment, and then time permitting, the State of Indiana requires ethics trainings for every commission every few years -- or two years, so if there is enough time, that training takes about twenty minutes. We can do that as well at the end of today's meeting.

And I apologize; $I$ do have a bit of a cold.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Thank you. Thank you, Judge Ryker. Are we okay with the sound system? Do we need to do any tests on that? JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: Not at this time. I was not able to call on the conference call line on the phone here, but the Commissioners are on the other phone, and when the time for using the interpreter comes, we can
call in on the wireless speaker phone.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. Thank you.
The next item on the agenda is the
approval of the previous minutes. I need a motion to approve.

COMM. SLASH: So moved.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a second.
COMM. HARRINGTON: Second.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All those signify by
saying aye. We'll have to do it individually, of course.

COMM. JACKSON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Thank you,
Comm. Jackson.
Comm. Blackburn?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Blackburn?
COMM. BLACKBURN: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Harrington?
COMM. HARRINGTON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Slash.
COMM. SLASH: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Aye. The motion
passes.
Okay. You might want to go on mute,
Commissioners, because we're getting a lot of background noise, until called upon.

We have the ICRC Director's Report. We're going to move that later in the agenda since the Executive -- the Assistant Director is not here. That takes us to Old Business, and we have seven elements of Old Business. The first one on the agenda is Carleana Barnes versus McDonald's Store. I had that case, and in this case I recommend to uphold the Director's findings of no probable cause.
(Ms. Posey entered the room.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a motion to
approve.
COMM. SLASH: So moved.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a second.

COMM. HARRINGTON: Second.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And I need approval
of -- motions of an aye or a nay.
Comm. Slash?
COMM. SLASH: Aye.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Harrington?
COMM. HARRINGTON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Jackson?

COMM. JACKSON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Blackburn?
COMM. BLACKBURN: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And aye as well.
The motion is approved.
The next case is Comm. Slash.
COMM. SLASH: Oh, in the case of
Develan Bland versus Ortho Indy Urgent Care, I'd like to uphold the Deputy Director's finding of no probable cause.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a motion to approve.

COMM. HARRINGTON: So moved.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a second.
COMM. BLACKBURN: Second.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All those in favor, signify by saying aye individually.

Comm. Harrington?
COMM. HARRINGTON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Jackson?

COMM. JACKSON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Blackburn?
COMM. BLACKBURN: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Slash.
COMM. SLASH: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And aye. Motion approves.

MS. BLAND: Excuse me; what's that mean?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: That means that in this particular case, the Director found in favor of -- or to uphold the decision of the Deputy Director of no probable cause.

MS. BLAND: So, he's saying it went in their favor?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: It is -- it is --
you would have to go through the case specifically, and in this case, it says no probable cause, so it would be in the Respondent's favor of no probable cause.

MS. BLAND: Okay. So, did you get the record -- did you get the tape?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: This is in --

MS. BLAND: Why didn't you get the camera? The camera will tell the truth. So, how can you -- how can it go in their favor when you didn't get the camera? That don't make sense.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, I did not review the case.

MS. BLAND: That's what $I$ was seeing of why didn't you get the camera? You can't just vote that in their favor when you didn't get the camera? Everything is on camera, and the camera would, you know, explain itself.

COMM. SLASH: We have --
MS. BLAND: I'm telling the truth.
They had no right to turn this away.
COMM. SLASH: We have time for public
comment at the end, and this --
MS. BLAND: Well, I didn't know -- I
ain't never been in this kind of meeting before, and when $I$ heard you say "Ortho Indy," I wanted to know what you mean by that, because how can they go in their favor when -- when it's on camera?

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                                    CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All of --
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MS. BLAND: You've got to get the camera.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: In these -- there is
a process and a procedure for providing all of the evidence that needs to be supported and given to the Commission, and there are time lines that are associated with that. And so, if you provided that information to them, then they would have reviewed that information. If you -if you did not, then it would be outside of --

MS. BLAND: I already told you. It's on paper, sir. I gave you that, told you to get the camera. That's up to her to get the camera since she was investigating it. That's wrong. How can it go in their favor? That's wrong. That's wrong.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Slash?
COMM. SLASH: I'm not the
investigator. All $I$ can use is the information that is provided from the investigator, from those --

MS. BLAND: It's in my records
telling you to get the --

COMM. SLASH: I only have is all of the things that were provided to me, and based on everything provided to me, I decided to uphold the Director -- the Deputy Director's finding of no probable cause.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And we can reveal
that after the case. You can have a discussion with the Executive Director, but again, with the information that we have and that which is provided --

MS. BLAND: It's on my papers,
though, sir. I provided you with all of that.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: You provided the comments, you didn't provide --

MS. BLAND: No, $I$ didn't provide you the camera, because that's up to them to give you -- like she said, she was going to do the footage, so she should have asked for the footage. I don't understand how you can put that in their favor when you didn't get the footage. That don't sit well with me, because I know I'm telling the truth, and it shouldn't go in their favor. If $I^{\prime} m$ seeing you upholding it, that
means you ought to open -- investigate this a little more, because you didn't handle this properly.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And she identified that she cannot investigate, and we review the information that we have.

MS. BLAND: So, it's over?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, in this case, you can file your process with them, and we can ask to have it reopened and we can review that, but this is --

MS. BLAND: What, file with you all again?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: You have to follow the steps of the process, and you can request to have it reopened, but at this point, this is upheld, the situation of no probable cause. Any information that has to be provided must be provided to the commission in the time lines they provide. After the fact, you have a Respondent and you have the Complainant, and both would have to approve to reopen that case, so --

MS. BLAND: Yeah, but it's up to
you -- it's up to you to get the tape, because you're the main person. You should have got the tape, plus I told everything to the people, the lady who first got my case, the second lady, the third lady, now you, and it's all on paper telling to you all to get the camera. The footage would tell the truth, and the truth will set you free. Now, it shouldn't have went in their favor, whenever you get through with it, because you've got to have the camera.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And you would -- we
would have to have evidence that they even have the footage for that.

MS. BLAND: It's on tape, sir. I
gave you the tape. It's on the tape.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: It's on the audio
tape? It's on the video --
MS. BLAND: It's on the audio tape.
She said, "I'll review the footage." You should have asked for it. Then I talked to her and I asked her, "Could you get the footage?" That's the main thing. You've got to get the footage, then you make up your decision. You've got to
get both sides before you make a decision. It just can't go in Ortho Indy's --

COMM. SLASH: We have a full
investigative report and --
MS. BLAND: No, you didn't. You
didn't investigate it good. No, you didn't,
because you should have got the footage.
COMM. SLASH: We appreciate --
MS. BLAND: We're on camera. We gave them the camera.

COMM. SLASH: We appreciate you
sharing.
MS. BLAND: That's wrong.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Ma'am, there's a
call to order.
MS. BLAND: I'm sorry; that's wrong.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: You can file a request with the Commission to have it re-reviewed --

MS. BLAND: I knew she wasn't going to do nothing.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: -- but at this
point, this case has been dismissed, or at least
it was upheld, the Director's finding of no probable cause. There is a process that you can follow if you so choose.

MS. BLAND: So, where do I go and do
that at?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: You can go to --
chat with the Executive Director or the -- or
call whoever your investigator was, and --
MS. POSEY: So, once you --
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: -- again, you can
file a motion.
MS. POSEY: If I may, once the
case -- once the complaint is filed, it's been investigated. The Commission created the finding of no probable cause in this case. You appealed your decision. It came to the Commission for the final --

MS. BLAND: Yeah, but you didn't --
MS. POSEY: -- word in this case.
MS. BLAND: -- get the camera. How are you going to make a decision when you didn't get the camera, ma'am? You didn't get the camera.
MS. POSEY: If the camera was sent to
the investi -- if the investigator --
MS. BLAND: No, you've got to ask for
it, because the lawyer said the only way you can get it, it's got to be approved by a judge.
MS. POSEY: Okay. So, we can talk
about this afterward, because $I$ don't have your file in front of me --
MS. BLAND: Okay. We'll you're the
one --
MS. POSEY: -- to say that we got the
camera or not, but $I$ don't --
MS. BLAND: Well -- and you've got
all of my paperwork. It's all in my paperwork.
MS. POSEY: So, I'd like to talk to you right after the Commission --
MS. BLAND: All right, then.
MS. POSEY: Thank you.
MS. BLAND: Shoot. That can't go in
their favor.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Thank you.
In the case of Hassanin $A 1 y$ versus
Steak $n$ Shake, Comm. Jackson?

COMM. JACKSON: To uphold the Director's findings of no probable cause. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a motion to approve.

COMM. HARRINGTON: So moved. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a -COMM. SLASH: Second.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Second by Comm. Slash. Those in favor, signify by saying aye.

Comm. Blackburn?
COMM. BLACKBURN: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Slash?
COMM. SLASH: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Harrington? COMM. HARRINGTON: Aye.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Jackson?

COMM. JACKSON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And aye as well.
Comm. Harrington?
COMM. HARRINGTON: In the case of
Jason -- I think it's Wineke -- versus Hamilton
Center, I uphold the no probable cause finding.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a motion to approve.

COMM. SLASH: So moved.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a second.

COMM. JACKSON: Second.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All those in favor, signify by saying aye.

Comm. Jackson?
COMM. JACKSON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Blackburn?

COMM. BLACKBURN: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Harrington?

COMM. HARRINGTON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Slash?
COMM. SLASH: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And aye as well.
The next case is Lisa Schneider versus the Concert Golf Partners, Comm. Blackburn.

COMM. BLACKBURN: Would you speak a little louder?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: This is your case,

Comm. Blackburn, Lisa Schneider versus Concert Golf Partners. What's your recommendation?
COMM. BLACKBURN: Oh, in the case, I'd like to uphold the finding of no probable cause.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay.
I need a motion to approve.
COMM. HARRINGTON: So moved.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a second. COMM. SLASH: Second.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Those in favor, signify by saying aye.
Comm. Slash?
COMM. SLASH: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Harrington?
COMM. HARRINGTON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Jackson?
COMM. JACKSON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Blackburn?
COMM. BLACKBURN: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And aye as well.
The next case is James Clark versus the
BMV. In this case, I recommend to uphold the Deputy Director's finding of no probable cause. I need a motion to approve.

COMM. SLASH: So moved.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a second.
COMM. HARRINGTON: Second.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Those in favor, signify by saying aye.

Comm. Jackson?
COMM. JACKSON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. --

COMM. JACKSON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Alpha --
Comm. Blackburn? I'm sorry.
COMM. BLACKBURN: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Slash?
COMM. SLASH: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Harrington?
COMM. HARRINGTON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And aye as well.
In the case of Victoria Johnson versus the Anderson Housing Authority. She submitted audio tapes in the last session. I did review those tapes, and again, $I$ recommend that we uphold the Director's finding of no probable cause. I need a motion to approve.

COMM. SLASH: So moved.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a second.
COMM. HARRINGTON: Second.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All those in favor, signify by saying aye.

Comm. Blackburn?
COMM. BLACKBURN: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Jackson?
COMM. JACKSON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Slash?

COMM. SLASH: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Harrington?
COMM. HARRINGTON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And aye.
That takes us to New Business and the appointment of Commissioners to the Complainants' Appeals of Director Findings. We have five cases to assign, the first of which is Veronica Zrnchik versus the Northern Indiana Public Service Company, and I will take that case. The next case is Rick Cavaness versus Aramark, Comm. Slash. The next case is Tony Finch versus Aramark, Comm. Harrington. The next case is

Kimberly Perez versus American Senior
Communities, L.L.C., D/B/A Eagle Care, L.L.C.,
Comm. Blackburn. Actually there are --
COMM. BLACKBURN: Pardon?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: -- two cases, four
and five are the same case, so $I$ recommend
assigning those both to Comm. Blackburn.
COMM. BLACKBURN: Would you send it
to me?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Absolutely, we'll
send that to you.
COMM. BLACKBURN: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: The next item on the agenda is Review of the ALJ Decisions and Orders. Do we want to do the Director's Report before we do that?

MS. POSEY: Sure.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay.
MS. POSEY: All right. Good
afternoon, Commissioners.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Good afternoon.
MS. POSEY: I'm here to present the
Agency Monthly Report for September. We're going
to skip that August at a Glance page and go directly to -- Intake Unit is on page four of the Director's Report -- I mean of the Agency Report. This is the full Agency Report that we create every month. It's available to the public, and I just wanted to highlight a couple of things.

The total number of inquiries that we received for the month of September went up from August, so it was 186 in August, up to 248 in September, so that also signifies that we started our marketing initiative in September, so hopefully we'll continue to see that number grow. So, I'm really happy to see -- I mean that's a pretty big jump from one month to the next, so hopefully we'll continue to see that number rise in number of inquiries that are received per month in our agency.

Another thing to note is the types of complaints that we received, on page seven. Unfortunately you can't really see it because it's highlighted for September on page seven, but this month we noted that the number of formalized complaints in September, the highest number was

Race, 34, and then followed by Disability at 20, and we're continuing to see both Race and Disability at the top.

But lately, in the past five or six months, Race has really taken the lead above Disability, whereas last year, if you recall, I talked a lot about Disability being our number one, but as of lately, Race has crept back up there in terms of complaints that we've received. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Any logic behind why? Any thoughts?

MS. POSEY: No, at this point, we don't really have -- I guess we haven't really looked at the data enough in comparison with the prior years to see, you know, kind of what that means.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay.
MS. POSEY: But it's always
interesting to see, you know, what is happening across the state in what areas, so what that does for $u s$ is it helps guide our marketing strategies and who we need to be partnering with and where across the state we need to be partnering. So,
those are some of the important things to share.
Another thing $I$ wanted to share, and we can -- I'll just speak on this. It's not really in the report. Usually when we are looking at -when we're thinking about our mediations, we're thinking about how much monetary damages can we secure for the aggrieved person. So, that's kind of the number one goal of the aggrieved person.

But at the Commission, our number one goal is the affirmative relief, to make sure that discrimination is not happening across the board. So, I wanted to present to you that recently we had a mediation where -- it was an employment case. The parties came to an agreement that there was no money to be involved, and in that matter, the Complainant just wanted an apology from her former employer, a handwritten apology, and they went with it and that was a part of the settlement. And to me, that is just as important as securing -CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Sure. MS. POSEY: $--\$ 50,000$, you know, for
someone who secured damages, because at the end
of the day, we're here to make sure that people are as whole as possible. That person didn't actually lose out on any money. They were trying to get re-employed somewhere, and the employer didn't want to re-employ them, so they didn't actually lose out on any money, so there was really no monetary damages in terms of wages, but we were happy to see that both parties came to that agreement, and they apologized for their action. So, to me, that was a win for September.

And last but not least, I wanted to, on the record, state that this will be my last Commission meeting as Deputy Director and General Counsel here. I am going to be moving on to a new opportunity after this month, so $I$ just wanted to thank you all for everything that you do for the Commission, and helping me throughout my journey here as well. So, thank you all.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Thank you. You've done a great job. We've enjoyed having the opportunity to work with you, and we definitely wish you great success. We know that won't be a problem because that's who you are.

MS. POSEY: Thank you.
CHATRMAN RAMOS: But thank you so
much for all you've done for us as well.
COMM. SLASH: We appreciate your
attention to all of the details helping us on these cases, and you put things together so that we could have a more -- I don't know what the word is I'm looking for here, but so that we could get ourselves up to speed, and for training us as the newer Commissioners that have come onto the -- onto our Commission. So, thank you.

MS. POSEY: Thank you.
COMM. HARRINGTON: And let us know if
you need us in your new journey.
MS. POSEY: I will.

COMM. SLAASH: I was going to say, you have diversity professionals that are up here -MS. POSEY: Yeah.

COMM. SLASH: -- cheering you on.
MS. POSEY: Thank you. Any questions for me in regards to the report or anything else related to the Commission?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Jackson,

Comm. Alpha -- or Blackburn; sorry about that -any questions for the Deputy Director?

COMM. BLACKBURN: No, but $I$ want to
comment that we want to thank you for your dedicated service to the Civil Rights Commission. MS. POSEY: Thank you.

COMM. JACKSON: And thank you for all of your great work, and God speed on your next opportunity, and we'll see you around.

MS. POSEY: All right.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Thank you.
So, the next item is the Review of the ALJ Decisions and orders. Judge Ryker?

JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: So, the first that's on the agenda is Jordan versus 8 Seconds Salon. Sorry. This was a case that was dismissed after both parties jointly requested the dismissal. Because of the large record in some of these cases, you'll note that the documents that are usually in a binder are provided in the three folders in front of you, and this is the case that is in the pink folder. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. In this case,

Jordan versus 8 Seconds Salon, we would make a motion or a vote to affirm the ALJ's order to dismiss this case after both parties have requested dismissal, so I need a motion to vote to affirm the order.

COMM. SLASH: So moved.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a second.

COMM. HARRINGTON: Second.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Although those in
favor, signify by saying aye.

Comm. Jackson?

COMM. JACKSON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Blackburn?
COMM. BLACKBURN: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Harrington?

COMM. HARRINGTON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Slash?

COMM. SLASH: Aye.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And aye.
The next item is a case that we heard oral
arguments on last month. This was He, as it's listed here, versus the Belterra Casino, and I'll just read this for the record: After conducting
a hearing on the merits, the ALJ found --
COMM. SLASH: I think you need to
call the --
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Ah, you're right.
COMM. SLASH: We need to call --
JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: We need to
call the interpreter.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Did we receive the interpreter? Is she here?

JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: I have to call and request it; I'm sorry.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Oh. Should we take a quick pause, or do you think we'll get instantaneous action?

JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: It may take me a minute to set this up.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. We'll do a pause for a second.
(Pause in proceedings.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I will call us back
to order. If you would on the phone, please, identify your name and I guess your translation number for the record, please.

THE INTERPRETER: Sure. Hello. My name is Cynthia Hahn, and that I.D. is CCCH, Charlie Charlie Charlie Henry.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I'm going to read to you a statement for swearing in. Please raise your right hand, and we will presume you have it raised. Do you affirm under penalties of perjury that you will justly, truly and impartially interpret to the witness the oath about to be administered to her, the questions that may be asked of her, and the answers that she may give to the questions relative to the cause now under consideration before this agency?

THE INTERPRETER: Yes, I do.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Thank you.
So, the process of this is we will discuss and then allow the interpreter to translate.

Cynthia, would you --
THE INTERPRETER: You want me to
translate this sentence, too; right?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Yeah. So, when you
hear the pregnant pause, that's your cue.
THE INTERPRETER: Uh-huh.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Do you want to move up here?

THE INTERPRETER: Okay. Understand. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: She can move up one chair if she would like, if it's -- if it provides better sound for you. Can you hear her okay, Cynthia?

THE INTERPRETER: She sounds a little bit far, so it would be nice if she can move up. (Interpreted.)

JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: Not to
interrupt. Comm. Blackburn dropped off the phone call, and she's calling back in.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. Thank you.
(Pause in proceedings.)
JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: Okay. Like
last time, I'm going to recuse myself from the room during the time of these.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay.
COMM. BLACKBURN: Comm. Blackburn.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All right. We
are -- we are back to our quorum as well.

COMM. HARRINGTON: Uh-huh.
COMM. SLASH: Uh-huh.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, in the -- in
this particular case of $H e$ versus the Belterra Casino, in our -- you can translate that. I'll try and pause.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: The Commission
provided orders to the ALJ on three parts, and we were out of process. I'll stop there.

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; can you
explain that again? I'm not understanding what you mean, because I'm totally -- I have no context.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. In our last
meeting, the Commission ordered the Judge to provide additional information, and so, we're going to discuss that, so $I$ was just breaking there so you could help explain it.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, we provided a --
after the meeting, we provided an order of correction, which corrected the error. All --
our options were to remand, uphold, reverse or dismiss this particular case.

THE INTERPRETER: Okay. I'm sorry; I
want to make sure $I$ understand. So, after the meeting, there was an order of correction, and then the choices are either to amend, dismiss or what else?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, in -- the normal
process for the Commission is to uphold, to dismiss, to reverse or to -- uphold, dismiss --

COMM. SLASH: Or remand.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Remand, yes, remand.
So, those are the four things that we can do.
MS. POSEY: So, you can uphold the
ALJ's decision --
THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; uphold? MS. POSEY: You can uphold the ALJ's decision, the Judge's decision, as is. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Do you want to translate that?

THE INTERPRETER: Uh-huh.
MS. POSEY: Go ahead and translate
that.
(Interpreted.)
MS. POSEY: No. 2, you can reverse
the Judge's de -- the ALJ's decision. Go ahead.
(Interpreted.)
MS. POSEY: No. 3, you can have the
ALJ reopen the hearing and have more invest -- or do more of the hearing. You can reopen the hearing.

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; can you say that again?

MS. POSEY: The Commission can reopen the hearing.
(Interpreted.)
MS. POSEY: So, today the Commission
is going to make a decision to uphold the -uphold the ALJ's decision as is or make any changes that they want to in regards to the order. They can totally reverse what the ALJ has done and said, "Instead of being for the Complainant, we reverse for the Respondent," or they can say, "Reopen the case and go back to the hearing. So, that is what the AL -- the Commission is charged with doing today.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. So, we -- so, we provided orders to the Judge instead of following the process just described.

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; can you
say that again?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, in the meeting, we provided orders to the ALJ that were outside of that which was just explained.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, to correct that, we need to make a decision --

COMM. SLASH: Uh-huh.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: -- as posted. We
need to remand it back to follow the directions in our last piece. We need to uphold, we need to reverse, or we need to dismiss. That's the orders that we need to do. Based on our questions that we had outstanding, my recommendation would be to remand it back to the ALJ, following the orders that we had submitted previously.

MS. POSEY: So, when you remand it
back to the $A L J$, you have to have specific instructions.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Which we do.

MS. POSEY: No, it must be "This
calcu --" if it was about a calculation, "This calculation is incorrect. Do this calculation," and not "Tell me how you did your calculation," or "We need a new calculation." You need to be specific as to what exactly you want --

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, the questions --

MS. POSEY: -- ALJ to do.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: During the arguments
there were questions that were raised in that -in that specific process. We couldn't answer the questions, so that's why we were asking for clarification.

MR. HEALY: Excuse, Mr. Ramos -- or Commissioner and parties. I should point out that $I$ filed with you a supplemental material in regard to the initial findings of fact, conclusions of law and order pursuant to 910 IAC 1-11-2, which states that at any time after a hearing has been closed but prior to
final determination, that upon the motion of any party, it could reopen to receive further evidence or argument. We are providing you with material specifically concerning the issue of communication in the barista position.

In its brief filed on August 23rd, the
Respondent also cited this regulation to introduce evidence that was not previously brought before the assigned Administrative Law Judge. We believe that it was important to do the same upon the point of -- solely upon the point of communication for the barista position. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Counsel, we have to translate.

MR. HEALY: Do you want me to start over?

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; I cannot translate because there's so much going on between -- you guys are just talking among yourselves, so interpreter doesn't know where -you would have to start over if you want it translated.

MR. HEALY: I'll start over.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, the key question
was from the Deputy Director, which had to do with orders; right?

Go ahead. Can you translate that?
THE INTERPRETER: Can you say that again? And please speak up when you are saying, because $I$ don't know whether you're talking among yourselves or you're wanting me to translate it.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. So, the
Deputy Director raised a question for the ALJ from a remand standpoint, that she needs to have specific directions to follow.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: During the oral arguments, the Commission had questions on understanding how the amount of renumination [sic] was created.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: We also had questions on the area of communication. (Interpreted.)

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, our
recommendation is to remand back to the ALJ for
those clarifying points.
(Interpreted.)
MS. POSEY: So, when it goes back to
the ALJ, her -- at this point, the only thing
that she can do is reopen the record, and if
there are those specific questions, reopen the hearing, or the answers -- oh, sorry. Uh-huh.
(Interpreted.)
MS. POSEY: Or the Commission looks
at the initial decision from the ALJ plus the briefs from the two parties during the appeal and the oral arguments to then make the decision.

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; can you
explain this one a little bit more, please?
MS. POSEY: Yes. The Commission
could also look at the initial decision from the Administrative Law Judge plus the materials from the two parties during the appeal and further from the oral argument that took place last month.

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; from the oral argument that took place -MS. POSEY: Last month.

| 1 | THE INTERPRETER: -- I couldn't hear |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | that word. |
| 3 | MS. POSEY: Last month, the argument |
| 4 | that they had last month. |
| 5 | THE INTERPRETER: Oh, last month. |
| 6 | MS. POSEY: Uh-huh. |
| 7 | (Interpreted.) |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. Counsel |
| 9 | Bremer, you had some additional points? |
| 10 | MR. HEALY: Yes. I'm Mr. Healy. |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I'm sorry, |
| 12 | Mr. Healy. |
| 13 | MR. HEALY: Thank you. |
| 14 | I filed Complainant's supplemental |
| 15 | material in regard to the initial findings of |
| 16 | fact, conclusions of law and order. |
| 17 | THE INTERPRETER: And I'm sorry, sir; |
| 18 | is that possible that you get closer to the |
| 19 | microphone? |
| 20 | MR. HEALY: Oh. I filed |
| 21 | Complainant's. |
| 22 | THE INTERPRETER: It is very hard to |
| 23 | understand what you're saying. |

MR. HEALY: I'll try to speak slower.
Well --
THE INTERPRETER: Thank you.
MR. HEALY: -- I filed Complainant's supplemental material in regard to the initial findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. (Interpreted.)

MR. HEALY: This was done because of the order on remand, which stated that one of the three issues to be determined was communication by Complainant in the barista position.

THE INTERPRETER: By -- I'm sorry -Complainant in the barista position?

MR. HEALY: Barista, yes.
THE INTERPRETER: Like a bartender?
MR. HEALY: Well --
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Think of Starbucks.

The employees at Starbucks are called baristas.
THE INTERPRETER: Okay. I see. (Interpreted.)

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Without going into all of the details, Mr. Healy, can you just net the pieces out, because we're going to push it
back in. We don't need the reopen all of the oral discussion from a month ago.
MR. HEALY: I'm making the motion
that this supplemental material be included for the reasons that are contained in my motion to you.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Do we have
representation from --
MR. PETTYGROVE: Yes.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: -- counsel?
MR. PETTYGROVE: May I?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Please.
MR. PETTYGROVE: Good afternoon. My
name is Joe Pettygrove. I represent Respondent, Belterra.
(Interpreted.)
MR. PETTYGROVE: For the sake of
time, I'll simply note Belterra objects to the introduction of additional evidence at this point.
(Interpreted.)
for about 30 minutes, but on quick review --
THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; can you say that again? $I$ just missed a couple of words, and $I$ cannot translate.

MR. PETTYGROVE: Sure. I've had this brief for about 30 minutes, but based on my quick review --
(Interpreted.)
MR. PETTYGROVE: -- the subject
matter -- rather the issue is not a surprise. It should have been explored in discovery, the parties should have put on their evidence at the hearing, and there's no justification for belatedly trying to put in this much new evidence at this point.
(Interpreted.)
MR. PETTYGROVE: And $I$-- if the
Commission wants a brief statement as to the
substance of the motion, I'm happy to give it, but I'll pause at this point on the procedural objection. Thank you.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Thank you.
Is there anything relevant?
MR. HEALY: Your Honor, four years
after Complainant's deposition was taken,
Respondent, for the first time, well after the hearing closed, tried to insert parts of the deposition into the record, even though it had never been introduced before the Administrative Law Judge. I am doing -- go ahead.

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; can -I'm sorry; please do not go on and on.

MR. HEALY: I'm sorry.
THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter
cannot translate accurately. And could you
repeat that and explain that a little bit, because $I$ have totally no background on what's going on. It's very hard to translate, very difficult, because words -- I cannot translate as a word, because $I$ have to know what's going on
first. Otherwise, you don't -- there may be some misunderstanding.
MR. HEALY: Four years after
Complainant's deposition was taken --
(Interpreted.)
MR. HEALY: -- Respondent, for the
first time, tried to insert it into the record.
(Interpreted.)
MR. HEALY: They cited the same
regulation that I cited.
(Interpreted.)
MR. HEALY: This material does not
address any facts regarding Belterra.
(Interpreted.)
MR. HEALY: It only speaks of Dusan's general language ability and how many words she would have to know to do the job.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: You have an
opportunity to counter that.
MR. PETTYGROVE: Thank you. Sorry.
The page or two of deposition testimony
Respondent submitted after the hearing --

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; can you say that again, please?

MR. PETTYGROVE: Yes. The page or
two of deposition testimony that Respondent submitted after the hearing --
(Interpreted.)
MR. PETTYGROVE: -- has nothing to do with the communications skills issue.
(Interpreted.)
MR. PETTYGROVE: Footnote 5 in our post-hearing brief explains why that submission corrects misstatements of the record.

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; can you
say that again, please?
MR. PETTYGROVE: I defer to
Footnote 5 in our post-hearing brief for explanation on that point.

THE INTERPRETER: You uphold to Footnote 5?

MR. PETTYGROVE: I would direct the Commission's attention to Footnote 5 in our brief.

THE INTERPRETER: Oh, okay.
effort to address an irrelevant point should not further delay resolution of this case.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Thank you.
MR. PETTYGROVE: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I think we have
enough information, Commissioners, that we can make a decision. I don't know that we need to go further into it. Do you need -- do you need further information?

COMM. SLASH: (Shook head no.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Do you,
Comm. Harrington?
COMM. HARRINGTON: No.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Jackson,
Comm. Blackburn, do you need any additional
information from either counsel?
COMM. BLACKBURN: No.
COMM. JACKSON: No.
COMM. BLACKBURN: No.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. So, to
clarify our options, to go back, we can remand
and reopen this case, which means that all
relevant information can be resubmitted?
(Intexpreted.)
MS. POSEY: It's hard for me to
answer that question. Really, what the
Commission needs to do is take all of the
information that they've received. I'll pause.
(Interpreted.)

MS. POSEY: And make the final
determination. So, the AL --
(Interpreted.)

MS. POSEY: The ALJ has had the
hearing, received all of the evidence from all of the parties.
(Interpreted.)
MS. POSEY: Based on the ALJ's
experience of hearing -- of being at the hearing, seeing the live testimony, reading all of the documents --
(Interpreted.)

MS. POSEY: -- she has made a
decision. And now the Commission must either accept her decision or not accept her decision.
(Interpreted.)
MS. POSEY: If the Commission does not accept the decision as it is, you must tell her exactly what you want to be changed. It can't just be --
(Interpreted.)
MS. POSEY: It can't just be
"Re-explain how you got to your calculations," or "Re-explain the communications." I'm not sure what the exact issue is here.
(Interpreted.)
MS. POSEY: It must be directed. It
must be -- the calculation -- if the issue is the calculation, then "The calculation is now two percent, and ALJ, redo your decision at two percent."
(Interpreted.)
THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; can you explain your point --

MS. POSEY: That was just an example.
THE INTERPRETER: -- about the
calculation?
MS. POSEY: Yeah, that was just an
example, that the Commission has to tell her exactly what to do, so she must -- they must tell her two percent or four percent, but they can't just tell her, you know, "Tell us how you got to your percentage."
(Interpreted.)
MS. POSEY: Now, on the other hand,
if the Commission believes that the record is incomplete --
(Interpreted.)

MS. POSEX: -- then the Commission
must tell the $A L J$ to reopen the record and get the exist -- the information that is incomplete. THE INTERPRETER: Okay. I'm sorry.

When you first say -- I'm sorry -- when the Commissioner think that the record is complete, maybe $I$ misheard you. Are you saying that if the Commissioner think the record is incomplete, then he must ask the ALJ to reopen and --

MS. POSEY: And find the specific -and find the specific information, yes. If it's incomplete, the ALJ reopens the record to get the specific information that the Commissioner
requests.
THE INTERPRETER: Uh-huh.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. So, the --
MR. HEALY: Excuse me. I'm sorry.
Your Honor, Mr. Pettygrove has made an objection
to my supplemental material. I would
respectfully request that there be --
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Translate.
THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; could
you say that again?
MR. HEALY: Mr. Pettygrove has
objected to my supplemental material that $I$ have filed.
(Interpreted.)
MR. HEALY: I would ask that the
Commission rule on that objection before a final determination is made.
(Interpreted.)
MR. HEALY: And in the event they sustain his objection, I would like to make an offer of proof to the Commission.
(Interpreted.)
COMM. BLACKBURN: What? I'm sorry; I did not hear.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. I think, from
the --
COMM. HARRINGTON: Comm. Blackburn
had a question.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Blackburn, did you have a question?
(Interpreted.)
COMM. BLACKBURN: I couldn't hear --
I did not hear what you said. You wanted a determination to be made regarding the supplemental materials prior to -- and I couldn't hear the rest of it.
MR. HEALY: Prior to -- should I
wait?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I don't know that that's relevant to translate.
MR. HEALY: Prior to the final
determination --
THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; I --
MR. HEALY: -- of the case.

THE INTERPRETER: -- totally do not
hear what's going on.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: It's just a
clarifying point, so you don't need to translate.
There's a question that she couldn't hear
Mr. Healy, so he's just clarifying it to the
Commissioner.
THE INTERPRETER: Okay.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Could you answer her question?

MR. HEALY: Yes. Prior to a final determination, that there be a ruling on the supplemental material, and if the ruling is -- if Mr. Pettygrove's objection is sustained, I would like to make an offer of proof.

COMM. BLACKBURN: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, we have an interesting -- this is an interesting process. Again, our options, we can uphold the decision -and it's really a two-part process. One is to uphold the decision of the findings, and then the second would be the amount of funding that would be provided.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, we can, again, uphold, reverse, or open. So, let's open that up for discussion, please. Go ahead.
(Interpreted.)
MS. POSEY: Now, when I say "uphold," you can uphold just the decision, right, but you can change the damages and the order however you want.

COMM. SLASH: I would like to propose that we uphold, but we change the calculation from front pay to back pay.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: SO, a motion is on the table to uphold --
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Go ahead; I'm sorry. THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Blackburn,
Comm. Harrington, did you hear that? The motion was made to uphold the decision of the Judge, but change the back -- change the renumination [sic] from back pay to front pay.
COMM. SLASH: From front pay to back pay.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Oh, from front pay to back pay.
COMM. SLASH: Thank you.
(Interpreted.)
COMM. SLASH: For clarification, can we have the original -- can we have the finding reread?
MS. POSEY: Do you have the --
COMM. SLASH: I may be confused. I
want it reread.
MS. POSEY: The initial order from the ALJ? Do you want to -- do you want to see it?
THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; what is it again? Can you repeat for the interpreter? CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Just a moment.
COMM. SLASH: From the calculation point that's written in the original order. I believe that was one of the questions of the Commission.
(Pause in proceedings.)

MS. POSEY: So, on page 26 you have the order from the ALJ. So, you must make a decision on the order. So, you can talk --
(Interpreted.)
MS. POSEY: You also have the briefs from the two parties that discuss their appeals, what they were appealing from this order, and that could -- both of -- all of those things together will help you make your final decision. (Interpreted.)

COMM. JACKSON: Mr. Chairman?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Go ahead,
Comm. Jackson.
COMM. JACKSON: DO I understand that there's a motion on the floor?

COMM. SLASH: There's --
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: There's a motion. Again, the motion was to uphold the Director's decision, and we had a question on the front pay/ back pay.

And do you want to translate that? (Interpreted.)

COMM. SLASH: My apology for the
confusion. I would like to uphold the order as found.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. So, we have
an amended motion to -- actually it wasn't approved, so we have a motion on the table to uphold the Director's findings.

MS. POSEY: The ALJ.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: The ALJ, sorry, the ALJ's findings as so written in the order, and $I$ need a motion to approve the motion.

COMM. JACKSON: Second.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a -- well, I
need a -- you made the motion, so we have a second, so let's open it for discussion.

COMM. JACKSON: I did.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, we're opening it
for discussion.

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; can you repeat that? There is a motion, and then -CHAIRMAN RAMOS: There's a second. THE INTERPRETER: What comes after that?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Discussion.
the --
THE INTERPRETER: -- you repeat
again, please?
COMM. BLACKBURN: -- the issue with
the back pay?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, a motion was
made to uphold the Direct -- the ALJ's findings, and it was seconded by Comm. Jackson.

THE INTERPRETER: Okay.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Blackburn, you
had a question?
COMM. BLACKBURN: Yes. Regarding the back pay, I'm not clear if that is included in the motion that is before us.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: On page 25 --
THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; can you
repeat that, because there's a lot of echo? I did not hear her at all.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Her question was she was not clear on the back pay.

| 1 | COMM. BLACKBURN: Correct. |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Do you want to |
| 3 | translate that? |
| 4 | (Interpreted.) |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN RAMOS: On page 25 of the |
| 6 | orders, it shows the calculations that were put |
| 7 | into place that came to the amount of 76,000 . |
| 8 | (Interpreted.) |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Did you find that, |
| 10 | Comm. Blackburn? |
| 11 | (Interpreted.) |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN RAMOS: There is no front |
| 13 | pay. It is all back pay. |
| 14 | THE INTERPRETER: You said, "There is |
| 15 | no front --" |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Yes, there is no |
| 17 | front pay. It's all back pay. |
| 18 | (Interpreted.) |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Blackburn, did |
| 20 | you find that? |
| 21 | COMM. BLACKBURN: Yes. |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Do you have any |
| 23 | further questions? |

COMM. BLACKBURN: No. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Jackson, do you have any questions?
COMM. JACKSON: No, I don't.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Harrington?
COMM. HARRINGTON: NO.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Slash?
COMM. SLASH: (Shook head no.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Motion has been made
and seconded to uphold the ALJ's findings. All those in favor, signify by saying aye.
Comm. Jackson?
COMM. JACKSON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Blackburn?
COMM. BLACKBURN: No.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Harrington?
COMM. HARRINGTON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Slash?
COMM. SLASH: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And $I$ say aye as
well. The motion carries.
THE INTERPRETER: Pardon?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And that includes
the renumination; correct?
COMM. SLASH: Correct. For the
record, though, can we say that we are -- can we make a ruling on the supplemental brief, that we are not including it?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: The decision's been made that it doesn't get included; right? If we uphold the --

MR. HEALY: For purposes of appeal,
it is necessary to rule on Mr. Pettygrove's
motion, and if his motion is granted, then $I$ have the right to make an offer of proof, and it's reversible error to refuse to allow me to make that offer of proof, I'm sorry to say.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All right.
Mr. Pettygrove, would you please reiterate your motion again?

MR. PETTYGROVE: Well, it's
Complainant's motion. We're objecting to it.
MS. POSEY: Uh-huh.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Your motion was to
submit the additional information?
MR. HEALY: Yes.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And yours is -- has objected to that?
MR. PETTYGROVE: (Nodded head yes.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, we need a motion on both of those, one to approve and one to -then advice?
MS. POSEY: So, you've already
approved the initial findings of fact, conclusion of law and order from the Administrative Law Judge. You have this pending motion here. What happens now is, after this case goes on appeal to the Court of Appeals, they have to know from the -- if the Commission accepted the additional supplemental information or not, and then they can -- they will take that into account.
If you don't accept the information based on his objection, then he is going to make an offer of proof, which means he's just going to speak into the record, so that when it goes to the Court of Appeals, they'll have the information.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. Can you
translator?
MS. POSEY: You -- the Commission will approve the motion from the Complainant or sustain the objection from the Respondent, and that information will help the Court of Appeals make a decision.

MR. PETTYGROVE: I don't want to get on anybody's nerves. If $I$ can --

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Let her translate first.

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; I can't hear you very clearly.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, the discussion
is to approve the motion from the Complainant, which is Ms. Yufen, to submit additional
information, and Respondent has objected to that motion.

THE INTERPRETER: Uh-huh.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: We need a motion
to --
MR. PETTYGROVE: I apologize.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Go ahead.

MR. PETTYGROVE: So, the Commission just voted four to one to affirm the ALJ's decision on the record before it. That's the Commission's vote. A motion to submit additional evidence after you've made your decision is asking to put additional evidence into the record after you made your decision. I think that's actually procedurally improper.

To the extent you want to consider additional evidence, $I$ think you need to undo the four to one, reopen the record, give us a chance to respond, and then revote one way or the other. But typically, once the Commission's made a decision on the merits, final, disposes of everything, the winning side doesn't get to say, "Here's a bunch more stuff we want to put in the record for the Court of Appeals."

COMM. HARRINGTON: For the -CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Director? We'll let the Direct -- I'm sorry we can't translate all of that, because we're trying to understand this. Procedurally --

MR. HEALY: May I respond? We are
not the winning side.
MS. POSEY: okay. We're not going to
take this -- we're not going to redo the argument.

MR. HEALY: Well, I just want -- I
just want to be able to make my offer of proof in the event that this motion to submit is denied, and $I$ asked that it be done before the vote, because the record's going to have to state on appeal that $I$ made the offer of proof.

MS. POSEY: So, the Commission has
made a decision to uphold the ALJ's findings.
Either you guys are done or you take that back and, like they both said, reopen it. So, it's up to the Commission at this point.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Commissioners, we
either have to reverse our decision and open it or uphold the decision we've already made.

Do you want to translate that quickly?
THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; which
part do you want me to translate?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Just the -- the
objections [sic] on the table are whether to
reverse our decision of upholding and reopen to provide additional information.
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Commissioners,
reverse and open or uphold and -- and confirm? Discussion?
(Interpreted.)
COMM. SLASH: I move that we uphold
and close the record, and we continue as --
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I don't guess we
need a motion on that, do we?
MS. POSEY: (Shook head no.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So --
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All right. So,
we -- so, the decision is final from the vote of four to one to uphold the ALJ's decision and recommendation in the case of $H e$ versus Belterra.
COMM. SLASH: And to keep the record closed and to not accept the --
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And to keep the
record closed at this point.
MR. HEALY: Is my motion to make an
offer of proof being denied, just for appellate purposes, to preserve it for -- on appeal?

THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry; can I
just translate what happened first, before there is all of the discussion?

MR. HEALY: Do I have --
THE INTERPRETER: Is it okay if the interpreter go ahead and just say what you just decided, because it's four to one, so the decision of ALJ is upheld, and also will not accept any new information; right?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: That is the -- that is the question at this point. Counsel Healy is --

THE INTERPRETER: Oh, okay. So -CHAIRMAN RAMOS: For the record, a decline of additional information, so -MR. HEALY: I'm making -- I wish to make an offer of proof to demonstrate on appeal what it is that's contained in my -- in my motion that we felt should have been considered by the Commission. I'm not asking the Commission to reconsider, but $I^{\prime} m$ asking that the offer of
proof be made. The Court of Appeals will have to --
(Interpreted.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All right. So,
the -- so, we need an official -- I don't know if we need a motion, but $I$ guess we do, because we need to either approve or decline. So, we need a motion to approve or deny the request from counsel to provide the additional proof of evidence.
MR. HEALY: It's called an offer of proof, Your Honor --
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Offer of proof.
MR. HEALY: -- and it's pursuant to
Nelson versus State, which states reversible error for the Judge to refuse it.
COMM. HARRINGTON: A point of
process. I don't know that we need to vote. I don't know that after a decision has been made, you go further. So, it just has to be taken at the next level.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Yeah.
COMM. HARRINGTON: Because the
decision has been made on the case.
MR. HEALY: This is the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. I have underlined --

MR. PETTYGROVE: Do you have a copy?
MR. HEALY: I'll give you that as soon as he's done.

MR. PETTYGROVE: What rule are you citing to?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And $I$ will read it.

MR. PETTYGROVE: What rule are you citing to?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: It's 4.02,
Chapter 4, "Offer of Proof."
MR. HEALY: Can Mr. Pettygrove see that, too?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, it does allow for it.

MR. PETTYGROVE: These are not Rules of Court or Rules of Evidence. This is a lawyer's treatise, and the rule that Mr. Healy is citing to applies during trial, when the record's open. I agree it would be error to decline an offer of proof during trial. The trial ended in

February. Once the record's closed, no more evidence gets put in unless you reopen the record.

Thank you.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Countercomment,
Mr. Healy?
MR. HEALY: Again, I don't wish to take more time than is necessary. It would just be a brief statement of what $I$ wished to put into the record.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: We would have to
cite ICRC rules and regulations to fully
comprehend that we are not a court of -- we're not, you know, a jury.

MR. HEALY: Again, 910 IAC 1-11-2,
under "Reopening Hearings."
(Pause in proceedings.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: That basically
affirms what Mr. Healy has stated. Would you like to review that, Mr. Pettygrove?

MR. PETTYGROVE: I'm familiar with
that regulation. You absolutely have the authority to reopen the record.

COMM. SLASH: But we closed it.
MR. PETTYGROVE: But you have to reopen the record to hear additional evidence.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Yeah, it states that the Commission, on its own motion or upon motion of any party, reopen the proceeding to receive further evidence or argument, which essentially reopens the case. So, the Commission has already made the recommendation, and we will deny the request, so the motion's ended.

COMM. SLASH: Okay.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Thank you both for your time.

MR. PETTYGROVE: Thank you all.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: If you would like to translate any of that, the net is we've, again, upheld the decision that was made. No further evidence is being allowed to be submitted.

MR. HEALY: Thank you, Your Honor. (Interpreted.)
(Discussion off the record.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Let's take a brief
recess to allow the next parties for argument to
get set up, please. We'll take ten minutes. (Recess taken.)

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: We will resume.
I didn't get the time for the last one, but it's 2:54. We are still in quorum. On the phone is Comm. Blackburn, and then present is Comm. Harrington, Comm. Slash and myself. Comm. Jackson had to drop for another meeting.

The next item on the agenda as a part of the ALJ Decisions and Orders is the hearing -- or the public arguments in the case of Mr. Terry Lymon and the UAW Local Union 2209. So, the procedure that we're going to follow is that we will have argument discussion, so you'll each get 15 minutes, and then we'll have five minutes of rebuttal. Are there any questions on those points?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I'm happy to not
have to translate that, so all right. Do we have a preference of who wants to go first?

> (No response.)

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: We'll allow

Complainant to go first, then.

MR. HICKS: And could I, Comm. Ramos, because $I$ don't want to interrupt him during his oral argument to object, but in his objections, he cited an Amy Reveal, and he cited evidence regarding Amy Reveal to support his objections. Amy Reveal did not testify at the ALJ's hearing. No evidence was entered into the record regarding --

MR. LYMON: Well, I was going to bring that up just now.

MR. HICKS: -- regarding Amy Reveal,
so obviously -- she was subpoenaed to testify -MR. LYMON: Her name was read into the record.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: That can be a part of your 15 minutes; okay, when you get -- and you can make comments on all of that.

MR. HICKS: Well--

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All right. Sir, we will go ahead.

And we have a timer? MR. DYER: Yeah.

MR. LYMON: Well, I'm requesting, first of all, that some other evidence be heard. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Identify yourself, please.

MR. LYMON: Terry Lymon, Ly mon. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Thank you.

MR. LYMON: And this is -- I'm requesting that the Commission, pursuant to IC 4-21.5-2-28, subsection (e), and Indiana Code 910 IAC $1-11-2$, that they open the hearing to receive -- to hear additional evidence. This evidence, all of it, it out of the blue book in which, in the hearing, Mr. Healy requested that it be added in as evidence, but there was an objection based on -- based on the voluminous of the blue book.

There were about 150 exhibits that he wanted to have entered, and Mr. Hick's had an objection to it based on it being too voluminous. But all of the exhibits that Mr. Hicks submitted and all of the exhibits that the Complainant submitted were out of this blue book.

And the predominancy of the records -- the
extra exhibits $I^{\prime} m$ requesting that you hear -are out of that book, I would say two to three of them, and one of them is an affidavit from a similarly situated Caucasian male, Mark Burbrink, who $I$ had the opportunity to locate and got an affidavit explaining that he was sent certified mail. That is one of the pieces of evidence that I would like for the Commission to hear.

And a letter from Bob King -- and they're all -- again, they'll all in the book -- and then the one that Mr. Healy -- I mean Mr. Hicks is referring to is an article, and the certified letter that Amy Reveal was sent, and her name was read into the record by Mr. Healy as being a witness for the Complainant. The subject had an emergency and could not make the hearing, but her name was read into the record as being a witness.

And $I$ testified to Exhibit 42 , which was a complaint dated 10-6-2004 at this hearing, and how it did not get submitted in as evidence, $I$ do not know, but $I$ did testify to this document, and that is one of the documents that $I$ am asking also to be considered.

And another one of the documents is a letter, a Certified letter, that came from the UAW Local 2209 to myself. What this document is going to prove is that deceit, collusion and trickery was used to prevent the Complainant, myself, from knowing exactly what was going on with my grievance. And in reference to this document, it will reference that there were two appeal hearings for the same grievance.

Now, the two appeal hearings -- this hearing was not a real hearing. It was used to deceive me, to make me believe that it was an appellate hearing, but $I$ learned later on that the grievance was still open. So, if they knew that the grievance was still open, why did they have an appeal hearing in 2004, November 18th of 2004, and then another one June 29th of 2011? That shows collusion and proves collusion between General Motors and the management, and this document will corroborate those facts, and I'm asking that that document also be considered.

And then, of course, the article, which will prove -- ostensibly prove that one of the
subjects, the shop chairman in question, Rich Letourneau, proves to be in collusion with management, because she -- Amy Reveal, that is, who was sent the Certified letter and brought back to work, when she went back to work, they terminated her again, and she texted Rich Letourneau.

And these texts that came back proves that she -- that Rich Letourneau was texting management, and some of the things that he was texting to management are very revealing in showing and proving that there is some collusion and complicity going on with the UAW Local 2209 and General Motors management.
(Discussion off the record.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. I mean we're
listening to what you have to say, and we --
MR. LYMON: Right.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: -- will make our
decisions on that.
MR. LYMON: Okay. Well, I've got --
I'm asking that the documents be considered, yes. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: The information that
was provided has to be provided to the ALJ on a timely basis. There's a structure and process for all of that. That decision's already been made. We're listening to arguments, if that would help to change that. I'm not -- I mean we'll listen to -- if you're done, then we'll go to Mr. Hicks to listen to his points. You each have counter options, then we will make our decision.

MR. LYMON: Well, yeah, I'm
understanding that, but it took no submission on my end, pursuant to the two statutes that $I$ just gave you. The Commission has that authority to do it if one of us submitted something, or if the Commission wanted to open it up on its own, it has that authority. So, there wasn't a requirement for me to submit anything. I just need to bring the documents, and it was at your discretion, at the Commission's discretion, as to whether or not they wanted to hear it.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Again, through the investigative process, that's where all of the evidence needed to be submitted. I mean after
the fact, it is after the fact. So, I mean is there anything else that you would like to discuss?

MR. LYMON: Well, I'm asking you. I
mean is --
COMM. SLASH: Did you -- did you
attempt to submit the additional things to the
ALJ prior to this hearing for us to consider accepting in the proper amount of time? Because you had notice prior to today's oral argument so we could have considered your evidence prior to today.

MR. LYMON: I did submit something to
the ALJ to be considered --
COMM. SLASH: Are the items in --
MR. LYMON: -- regarding these
documents.
COMM. SLASH: Are the items in -- but did you include the documents?

MR. LYMON: No, I didn't.
COMM. SLASH: Okay. So, that would have been where you had to do those. You would have had to include them at that time for us to
then have as a part of the record.
MR. LYMON: Well, am I not
understanding this Administrative Code 1-11-2, which state at any time at a hearing has been -after a hearing has been closed but prior to a final determination, the Commission may, on its own or on the motion of any party, reopen the proceedings and receive further evidence or argument.

You guys have that -- according to this statute, you guys have that power. It didn't take a submission of evidence to the ALJ to get it considered. You have that authority, according to this statute, to either -- to make a decision whether or not to hear the additional documents or not. That's the point that I'm making. You --

COMM. SLASH: Correct. But you could have submitted them to the ALJ prior to today for us to accept or deny prior to today, so that we could include them in our conversation today. MR. LYMON: Well, he just -- well, Mr. Hicks just gave me something in response to
that, and I did not receive it, and I'm sure you didn't, either. And I submitted something, and I'm sure you didn't get it, so I mean --

COMM. SLASH: You submitted, but did you not include the actual evidence?

MR. LYMON: No, I did not conclude [sic] the documents.

COMM. SLASH: Okay. At that time would have been your time to include the documents.

MR. LYMON: But I'm still not understanding what you're saying, because the statute here says that it's not necessary, that you have the latitude --

COMM. HARRINGTON: Well, we can, but there's -- it's based on grounds, so there's been nothing provided to us that would make us say, "We need additional information." There's no grounds. You're just coming in saying, "You have the ability." Yes, we do, but there's been no information provided to say why would we do that. So, you're asking us to make a decision because we have the authority, but not giving a reason to
the why we would.
MR. LYMON: Well, I'm explaining -- I
think I just explained every -- I can explain
every document to you and how it's relevant to
the case, and that is what -- but this statute
does not denote -- it does not say that I had to
submit something. It says that the -- and that's
what I'm acting on. It said that the Commission
has the authority to hear additional evidence.
COMM. HARRINGTON: So, you can state
why you think we should see it, and then we'll --
MR. LYMON: I did state that, yes.
Here's a copy of it. I did state --
COMM. HARRINGTON: Okay.
MR. LYMON: -- the reasons why I
thought it should be heard.
COMM. HARRINGTON: And he's asking
did you -- have you stated your full case of why you want us to consider the additional information? Because that's what this hearing is for.

MR. LYMON: Stated --
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: We're going to
listen to all parties --
COMM. HARRINGTON: To why you --
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: -- before we make a decision.

COMM. HARRINGTON: -- want us to look at additional information.

MR. LYMON: For these very reasons.
It corroborates and proves the facts of collusion and race discrimination, as $I$ wrote in the -when $I$ submitted this to the Docket Clerk, the reasons why I asked for the documents to be considered.

COMM. SLASH: And why didn't you include them as attachments when you submitted that?

MR. LYMON: Well, I didn't think that I needed to, being that you guys, you had the authority to make the decision. And when I've given you the reasons why I'm asking to be -- for it to be submitted, then $I$ thought you'd read it and just render a decision.

If it's relevant and if it's going to
be -- because the issue and the primary objective
here is to get to the truth of the facts: Was there discrimination and was there collusion or was there not?

And if $I$ have documents that can
corroborate the points that I'm making, I
denote -- $I$ made sure that $I$ denoted all of them
in here, in the -- in my submission, and that is why $I$ am here again now submitting this and giving you the reasons why $I$ think these documents should be submitted.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, you were working with Mr. Bremer; is that correct, or -MR. LYMON: Pardon?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Who was the counsel
that was assigned to --
MR. HICKS: Healy.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Mr. Healy?
MR. LYMON: Mr. Healy.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All right. And why
isn't he with you now?
MR. LYMON: The -- he said that they weren't going to pursue it, the issue, the case. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Did you provide any
additional information to Mr. Healy?
MR. LYMON: I did.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And his response
was?
MR. LYMON: He just instructed me on what to do.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. Any further discussion?

MR. LYMON: Regarding what?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Again, you have an opportunity to discuss, then we will pass it to Mr. Hicks.

MR. LYMON: Well, I'm discussing these documents. I mean I'm -- you know, I'm emphatically trying to stress that $I$ think that they are extremely important in showing you, because Mr. Burbrink is one of the ones -- on June 15th, 2007, when my grievance was withdrawn without prejudice, Mr. Burbrink's grievance -- he was sent a Certified letter informing him to return to work upon conditions of employment, and he's a similarly situated white male. He was called back to work.

I was -- my grievance was withdrawn, on the very same day, and $I$ think this is really pertinent information that proves that the -that all of the -- the conclusions of law that the ALJ stated, that it -- there was no connection in race, when there was ample examples of how it was race related, so -- and this right here, this document is proof positive. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. MR. LYMON: So, you're saying that I have only 15 minutes to state a case? CHAIRMAN RAMOS: You've had a lot of opportunity to provide that, including with Mr. Healy, so that's when you had the opportunity. We --

MR. LYMON: I'm talking about now.
I'm talking about now -CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Yeah. MR. LYMON: -- to present the case. You're saying that $I$ only have 15 minutes to present all of this evidence. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: For this -- for us, a decision to make as in regards to upholding the
decision made, it is. I mean you had the --
MR. LYMON: Well, there was twenty -I had twenty-something objections of -- there were conclusions of law and findings of facts that I oppose, and I had the documents to prove that --

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And again, they were not submitted.

MR. LYMON: -- that she erred.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: From a timing
standpoint, there was -- you missed the timing deadiine.

MR. LYMON: How did $I$ miss the timing deadline?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, when you -- this was the conversation that Comm. Slash had. So, you provided the information that's relevant to --

MR. LYMON: You're talking about the
documents. I'm talking about -- having entered now. I'm talking about all of the information that you're asking me to submit information on and submit a case on in 15 minutes. That's what

I'm asking you.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Our -- this provides you an opportunity to address the concerns of why your case should be reversed, all right, with the information that we have. It isn't opening the whole case to review all of that. We do not investigate. That is not our role. Our role is to make --

MR. LYMON: I understand.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: -- a decision.
MR. LYMON: I understand. I was just
asking that six documents be entered as evidence. Okay. All right. Fine.
(Discussion off the record.)
MR. LYMON: So -- so, now what?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, now we listen to the counterpoints from Mr. Hicks. So, we won't make a decision until we get through all of this. MR. LYMON: Okay. All right. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And you're yielding your last minute?

MR. LYMON: Well, there ain't enough
time to even scratch the surface of what has
transpired and things of this nature, so $I$ might as well.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Mr. Hicks.
MR. HICKS: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Identify your name
for --
MR. HICKS: Sure.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: -- the record.
MR. HICKS: Sure. I'm Rob Hicks.
I'm the attorney for the only Respondent in this case, and that's Local 2209.

It's stipulated and undisputed that
Mr. Lymon contended in his ICRC complaint that the Local discriminated against him on the basis of his race in connection with a grievance that it withdrew in 2007 to challenge his termination of 2004, and an appeal that he filed to challenge the Local Union's decision to withdraw his grievance that he filed in May of 2011 , and that he knew that the Local had denied in July of 2011.

And I just want to make three broad points. These are the reasons that we contend
that the ALJ's decision should be affirmed and that the Commission should enter its final order.

Number one, as the ALJ properly concluded, there is no evidence that Local 2209 withdrew Mr. Lymon's grievance because of his race, and then there's also no evidence that the shop Committee denied his appeal because of his race. So, the central finding of Judge Ryker was Mr. Lymon did not carry his burden of proving race discrimination, and we contend that that decision should be affirmed.

We also filed our own objections, because we take issue with other aspects of the Judge's decision. Number one, we view Mr. Lymon's complaint as untimely. In fact, we think it's well untimely. As you all know, under the Indiana Code you have six months, or 180 days, to file a discrimination charge.

Mr. Lymon has admitted that he knew in
April of 2011, at least no later than April
of 2011, that the Local had denied his grievance and withdrawn his grievance, and he also has admitted on the record that he knew no later than

July of 2011 that the Local had denied the appeal challenging the withdrawal of the grievance. His complaint was filed April 23rd, 2012, and it's clearly untimely under the law.

And the third point that $I$ want to make in my time is that Mr. Lymon received everything that he was entitled to receive. He was terminated from GM after there was a dispute over whether he could perform a job. The Union invoked the contractual procedure that allows for an Independent Medical Examiner to determine whether he can perform the job.

Mr. Lymon had the IME. The Independent
Medical Examiner issued, under the contract between the Union and GM, the final and binding decision -- and it's final and binding on Mr. Lymon, the Union and the company -- that Mr. Lymon could perform the --

That can't be right.
COMM. HARRINGTON: No, it's not right.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: He just started.
Okay. So, he's still got --

MR. HICKS: Okay. I'm sorry. Never mind.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: It's 11:45.
MR. HICKS: All right. I apologize.
That threw me off for a second. But Mr. Lymon had an Independent Medical Exam. The Independent Medical Examiner issued the final and binding decision that he could perform the job.

Mr. Lymon never returned to work.
The Union still filed yet another
grievance on his behalf, processed that grievance for three years, and decided that it couldn't pursue it any further because GM wasn't going to budge, they weren't going to reinstate him, and they were relying on that language in the contract that says the decision is final and binding.

Four years later, after not turning up at all for 2008, 2009 and 2010, Mr. Lymon asked about his grievance. He was told then, again, that the grievance had been withdrawn. He filed an appeal under the UAW Constitutional procedure that allows for decisions like the withdrawal of
grievances to be challenged.

And he appealed that all of the way up through every rung of the appeals procedure, and ultimately, an independent body, the public Review Board, that doesn't include any Local Union or International Union members, decided that his appeal had no merit, because the union properly withdrew his grievance and did not harbor any hostility towards him. So, his case is, quite frankly, moot. He got everything he was entitled to receive, and then some.

So, again, you know, I'll give you a little bit more background information, then circle to me -- circle back to my argument since I have the time. As I stated, Mr. Lymon worked at the GM Fort Wayne Assembly Plant. The Local represents employees at that plant as well as employees as other plants.

During the summer of 2004 , Mr. Lymon was on sick leave. GM called him back to work. Mr. Lymon contended that the job he was assigned to by GM, that was inconsistent with his medical restrictions. He returned to work, but he didn't
do the job, so a GM officer said, "Look, you've got two options: You can either work the job or you can be fired."

Five days later, under the contract, Paragraph 64(d), they said -- they terminated him because he had not reported to work in five days, and to actually work, and he had therefore relinquished his seniority. The Union then, as I said earlier, invoked Paragraph $43(b)$ of the contract.

That paragraph allows for an Independent Medical Exam, and as $I$ stated -- and this is in Stipulated Exhibit 2, page 35 -- the decision of the Independent Medical Examiner is, quote, final and binding on the Union, the employee involved, and the Corporation.

Mr. Lymon participated in the Independent Medical Exam, and the Union had a deal in place with GM where, if the Independent Medical Examiners found that the job was inconsistent with his restrictions, then they would reinstate Mr. Lymon. Unfortunately for Mr. Lymon, the Independent Medical Examiner issued the final and
binding decision that he could do the job, and yet he never returned to work.

So, Mr. Lymon was still upset with the decision. He asked the Union to file another grievance, a written grievance, which is in the record as Stipulated Exhibit 7, and that's this grievance. That grievance challenged his termination. It's undisputed that for three years the Union attempted to return Mr. Lymon to work, and it's undisputed that $G M$ would not allow Mr. Lymon to return to work, relying on that final and binding language.

So, in June of 2007, the Shop Chair, Dave Matthews, withdrew the grievance, and he -- and that was the end of it; okay? Now, Mr. Matthews contends that he called -- that Mr. Lymon and him talked on the telephone. Mr. Lymon contends that he never spoke with Mr. Matthews about the -about the decision to withdraw the grievance.

But what we do know is Matthews leaves the plant in April of 2008, and there's no evidence that Mr. Lymon follows up on his grievance until April of 2011. And at that time, he was
informed, in both writing and orally, that his grievance had been withdrawn.

So, the UAW Constitution, as I said, has an internal appeals procedure. It allows for decisions like the withdrawal of grievances to be challenged, but appeals have to be filed within 60 days of the date that the employee either knew or reasonably should have known of the decision that they're appealing. So, Mr. Lymon filed a griev -- an appeal with Local 2209, challenging the withdrawal of his grievance.

And the Local Shop Committee, which did not include Mr. Matthews, decided that "Look, we don't know if you're telling the truth or if Matthews is telling the truth, but either way, your appeal is untimely, because you had 60 days, and that's not from the date that you knew, it's also from the date that you reasonably should have known. And you're now coming back after at least four years, and most likely seven years, to check on your grievance."

So, Mr. Lymon continued to appeal his
case, as I said. He pushed it all of the way up
to the Public Review Board. The Rublic Review Board could have reinstated his grievance, it could have ordered the payment of back pay, but it didn't do so.

And it didn't do so not only because the grievance -- the appeal was clearly untimely, but it also did so because after hearing evidence from Mr. Lymon, it determined that the Local Union properly withdrew his grievance, and its decision was, quote, so clearly rational and that it did not harbor any hostility or exhibit any hostility towards Mr. Lymon. That's in the order as Stipulated Exhibit 27.

So, again, three arguments. There is no race discrimination. That's what the Judge found. Lymon's own admissions during the hearing support that finding. I have the transcript cites here, but in the interest of time, I'll just read them to you.

Page 396, line 8 to 17 of the hearing transcript: Question: "...as we sit here today, you can't identify a single employee who the Local Union handled a grievance differently in
connection with any of the possible reasons...you were terminated?" Lymon's answer: "Well, I'm trying to understand how it relates to my being -- why $I$ was terminated, but no, as to your question."

In addition, page 420 of the transcript, lines 5 to 16 , my question to Mr. Lymon: "...going back to the Local Union's decision to deny your appeal, you don't have any evidence that the Local Union handled an appeal, a similar appeal, differently for a Caucasian employee; correct?" Mr. Lymon's answer is on line 16: "No."

Mr. Lymon also made a contention that he should have gotten written notice about the withdrawal of his grievance, but yet he admitted at the hearing that he didn't have any evidence that any Caucasian similarly situated employee received such notice.

Line 40 -- excuse me -- transcript page 40 [sic], line 8 to the end of the page, and then the first line on page 431, question: "You don't have any evidence that Mat hews gave the
notification in writing that you contend you were supposed to receive to another white employee; correct?" Lymon's answer: "No, I don't think so."

Question: "You don't have any evidence that he sent a letter to a white person that you contend that you should have gotten?" "I don't -- at this point, $I$ don't think so." So, Lymon therefore admitted he has no evidence that the Local Union discriminated against him in the ways that he said that they did.

The Judge also relied on other undisputed evidence to support her conclusions that Lymon didn't carry his burden of establishing race discrimination. For example, she found that Matthew -- that the collective bargaining agreement in the Union contract or the Union Constitution did not require employees to be notified of the withdrawal of their grievances, that no policy existed when Lymon's grievance was withdrawn, that there was no evidence that the individual, Matthews, who withdrew Lymon's grievance, sent written notification to any other
employees.
And then with respect to the Local's handling of his appeal, she found that the seven-member committee reasonably and unanimously concluded that his appeal was untimely, because it should have been filed before May 2011, and he reasonably should have then known that his grievance had been withdrawn more than 60 days before that.

And again, just pointing out what the Union did on his behalf. He had a grievance. He had an Independent Medical Exam. He had another grievance. And again, they reasonably concluded that his appeal had no merit because it wasn't filed.

I'm going to just briefly go to my other arguments. Timeliness he admits that he knew that the Local Union was done with his appeal in July of 2011. He admits that he knew that they were done with his grievance in April of 2011. It's a six-month statute of limitations.

We think the Judge in error applied the continuing violation doctrine. That does not
apply to discrete events. That applies to hostile work environment claims, for one, and Mr. Lymon is clearly complaining about discrete events. The withdrawal of his grievance, the alleged failure of giving notice of the grievance and the denial of his appeal. All of those, it's undisputed, occurred and he knew about before six months prior to the filing of his complaint.

And in addition, the Judge found there was a continuing violation because she found that the Local Union was called to participate in an international appeals hearing on March 22nd, 2012. Well, in Delaware v. Ricks it's well established that an internal grievance procedure does not start a new clock for the filing of charges. In that case, the Supreme Court said the pendency of a grievance or some other method of review of an employment decision does not toll the running of the statute of limitations.

Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in
Soignier v. American Board of Plastic Surgery, says that an employee's pursuit of an internal grievance procedure does not affect the date on
which his claim accrued. Unlike in an EEOC investigation, internal appeals are not part of the statute -- statutory procedure and do not toll the time for filing suit.

So, again, in addition to the fact that there's no race discrimination, we also feel that clearly this is an untimely -- an untimely decision.

And that's my time.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. Are there any questions for Mr. Hicks?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All right.
Mr. Lymon, you have five minutes for rebuttal.
MR. LYMON: Okay. Eirst of all,
there was no grievance written at the time I was terminated. I was terminated July 28th, 2004. While the grievance was written -- was only written until when $I$-- and there's evidence in the record. $10-6-2004$ is the complaint. When I complained to Janet, who was a manager in Detroit, Michigan, she called the plant, and after $I$ called her on October 6th, then

October 11th, a grievance was written.
So, I went all of the way through the grievance process -- and I'll get to the point of racial discrimination -- I went all of the way through the grievance process with no grievance written. Jonathan Burget had a grievance written. Mark Burbrink had a grievance written. Amy Reveal had a grievance written. I had no grievance written. I went all of the way, Step One, Step Two, Step Three, all of the way through the grievance procedure, no grievance in place.

The appeal. The appeal did not settle sort of anything. They acted on "reasonably should have become aware." Well, no one in the plant would communicate with me. They've tricked me and made me think that there were two different appeals, so I didn't know what stage the grievance was. And by the National Labor Relations Act, it states that it must be -- the grievant must be known and kept apprised of what's going on with the grievance. Another point of racial discrimination.

Now, the grievance being untimely. Again,
how could I know? The grievance sat for three years and they did nothing, absolutely nothing. They didn't do anything with it. And then on June 15th, 2007 they decide to withdraw the grievance. Dave Matthews did, Shop Chairman.

Now, at the same time, Mark Burbrink, a similarly situated white Caucasian male -Caucasian male; I'm sorry -- on -- well it's in the record, Stipulated Exhibit A, his grievance, they sent him a Certified letter and returned him to work. Dave Matthews went back to GM management and negotiated Mark Burbrink's grievance, and he got his job back on conditions of release.

Amy Reveal, in 2018 -- she was terminated in 2014. She stayed out of the plant, off work, terminated for four years. They sent her a Certified letter, and which I have in the record, informing her that her termination has been switched to 30 days off work and balance of the shift, and she was to return back to work. So, that's a connection of race discrimination. On the very same day that my grievance was withdrawn
without prejudice, Dave Matthews went to the management and negotiated Mark Burbrink's, a similarly situated white male's, grievance back.

As far as timeliness, the UAW Constitution states obligation to exhaust internal Union remedies. It shall be the duty of any individual or body, if aggrieved by any action, decision or penalty imposed, to exhaust fully the individual or body's remedy and all appeals under -- under this Constitution and rules of this Union before going to a civil court or governmental agency for redress.

I had no choice but to exhaust the internal administrative due processes from before I came, and on March 22nd, when I got the final decision from the Public Review Board, I -- I'm sorry -- I then went and filed with the ICRC.

Secondly, I was terminated for a medical reason. It was not a terminable offense. I was placed on a job $I$ could not do on June 14 th, then they called me back in, stripped me of all of my restrictions, and ordered me back on the job. GM management did this, and UAW refused and failed
to write a grievance.
Now, the final and binding,
Paragraph 43(b) -- excuse me for talking fast -Paragraph 43(b) was used improperly. The rules and regulations -- General Motors and management got togeth -- the UAW and management got together and they agreed to this change. Paragraph 43(b) states any decision by a mutually agreed IME is final and binding on every party.

The IME said that $I$ could do the job. What was supposed to happen was GM was supposed to send me a 64(d) letter informing me to return back to work to do the job, because that was the decision of the IME. They changed it. They said if the IME says $I$ can do the job, I remain terminated, and that's what happened.

And the union was in collusion with them and failed to file a grievance in that regard. They used Paragraph 43 differently. I was already terminated. Why would General Motors send me to an IME? They fired me August 2 nd.

And secondly, the IME -- I didn't see the IME until August 4 th. They sent me a 64 (d)
letter on August 2nd, two days before $I$ went to the medical examination, telling me that $I$ was terminated based on the IME results. How could I be terminated August 2nd based on the IME results, and $I$ didn't see the IMO -- IME until

August 4th?
That shows the collusion right there.
They -- unless they've got some type of clairvoyant or psycho powers that can know what the IME was going to say. They fired me with a Certified letter, which is in the record, before -- on August 2nd, before $I$ went to see the IME August 4 th.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Are there any
questions for Mr. Lymon?
COMM. SLASH: (Shook head no.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Mr. Jackson, are you still there?

COMM. SLASH: He left.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Oh, I'm sorry.
COMM. BLACKBURN: Yes, I'm here.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Thank you.
Rebuttal?

MR. HICKS: Yeah, sure. Amy Reveal did not testify. There were two days of hearing. She was subpoenaed. She didn't show up. I have no idea -- all that he said about Amy Reveal is hearsay, because it was not -- it's not part of the record, and it was -- I had never met her. I have no idea of what her situation is. We didn't get to cross-examine her. So, with respect to that, that's just inconsistent with the record.

MR. LYMON: It's in the record.
MR. HICKS: With respect to -- with respect to his argument that the $I M E$ was somehow out of order, let's go back to the beginning. They sent him multiple $64(\mathrm{~d})$ letters, because throughout the summer there was an -- and these are in the record -- throughout the summer there was an argument between $G M$ and $M r$. Lymon as to whether he could return to work.

And so, they sent him one earlier in the summer; $I$ believe they sent him one on July 21 st. Mr. Lymon comes to the plant on July 28 th, but he doesn't perform the job. He still says that he can't do the job.

So, GM sends the letter on August 2nd, saying, "Look, we provided you the notice. You have five days under the contract. You didn't return to actually work, you just returned to make your argument." And so, that's why they terminated him.

In connection with that, the Union implemented a grievance under Paragraph 43(b) that allowed for the Independent Medical Exam, and the whole point of him having the Medical Exam was to see whether he could do the job or not, and it's undisputed that GM would have put him back to work if it came down in his favor. As it turned out, it didn't come down in his favor.

Mark Burbrink. He never made the argument about Mark Burbrink until now, essentially. He never cited him as a comparator. Mark Burbrink -- Matthews testified credibly that he never provided him any notice that Mr. Lymon contends he received.

Mark Burbrink was terminated in connection with a totally different issue. He wasn't
terminated because there was an IME that said he couldn't work. He was terminated because his five-year-old son drowned in the swimming pool, and he had attendance problems.

So, Matthews was able to negotiate a return to work for Mark Burbrink, but GM wouldn't make that same deal for Mr. Lymon because it said, "Look, the contract says 'final and binding,' and we have a decision that says you can work and you never returned to work."

Jonathan Burget, that's not within the Judge's decision. She correctly concluded that he's not similarly situated. Though a member of the Local, he has a different employer, he has a different contract, he wasn't terminated for the same reason, and the Local Union didn't give him anything that it didn't give Mr. Lymon.

Mr. Burget's grievance with withdrawn by an International Union rep, so the Local Union didn't withdraw his grievance, didn't make a determination about his grievance. As I said earlier, Mr. Lymon had effectively two grievances, one which $I$ held up. GM never argued
that the grievance was late and that they wouldn't entertain it, so there's no procedural problems.

And with respect to the NLRA, well, I mean obviously, as you guys -- as the Commissioners know, that's not binding with respect to you, because your job is to enforce the Indiana Civil Rights Act. But since Mr. Lymon brought it up, he also filed a charge with the NLRB that was dismissed on timeliness grounds, for the same reason.

So, the -- and he appealed that to
Washington D.C., and this all in the record, and the General Counsel's Office, like the Public Review Board, said the Union did nothing wrong. They found against Mr. Lymon.

And Mr. Lymon is wrong that he had to exhaust the internal appeals procedure before he came here. He actually filed his complaint while the appeals procedure was ongoing, so that's a misstatement and that's incorrect as a matter of law.

And, you know, again, the Judge's decision
is well supported. Mr. Lymon has not given you any reason to disturb the Judge's decision, which was, at the end of the day, he can't prove a link between his race and -- to the withdrawal of the grievance, just whatever notice was or wasn't provided with the withdrawal of the grievance and the denial of the appeal.

And then just because I have 30 more seconds, the Public Review Board specifically -this is the end of the rung. The Public Review Board -- he did get to appeal, and the Public Review Board said, "Even if his appeal was timely, nothing would be gained by reactivating the appeals process at this point, because the decision to withdraw the grievance as so clearly rational. We have repeatedly upheld the Union's conclusion that it could not achieve reinstatement of employee through arbitration, where it has been established that the employee failed to comply with the five-day letter."

And I'll stop at that.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Commissioners, any
questions for Mr. Hicks?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All right. We have, just as a reminder, the order from the ALJ was that Mr. Lymon's complaint against the UAW was dismissed with prejudice, and the UAW Local Union 2209's request for an award of expenses is denied, and this is the -- this is the decision that's in front of us today. We need to make a decision to uphold, to remand, to reverse, or dismiss. I open it for discussions.
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Do $I$ hear a motion?
COMM. SLASH: Comm. Blackburn, are you still there?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Blackburn?
COMM. BLACKBURN: Yes.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All right. So,
Commissioners, I need an action.
(Discussion off the record.)
COMM. SLASH: Can you read our
choices again, please?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Our options, again,
we have two elements that are here. One is the complaint against the UAW be dismissed with prejudice, and the second is the award of expenses to the UAW, which has been denied. We can affirm, reverse, uphold -- affirm is the same -- reverse, or dismiss. Those are our options. We can reopen the case again, too, but I don't know if --

COMM. HARRINGTON: Huh-uh.
COMM. SLASH: Do you have any
questions?
COMM. HARRINGTON: No, I don't. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I still need a motion.

COMM. SLASH: Okay. At this point, based off of all of the evidence that we've heard and the arguments that we've heard here today, I would like to move that we uphold and affirm the ALJ's findings on both.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: On both counts? COMM. SLASH: Yes.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Motion's been made
to affirm the decision from the ALJ to dismiss
with prejudice the complaint against the UAW, and to award -- to deny the award of expenses to the Local Union. I need a second.

COMM. HARRINGTON: I'll second.
COMM. BLACKBURN: I'll second.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Seconded by
Comm. Harrington. All those in favor of
upholding or affirming the decision, signify by saying aye individually.

Comm. Blackburn?
COMM. BLACKBURN: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Harrington?
COMM. HARRINGTON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Slash?
COMM. SLASH: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And aye. Motion's upheld.

Thank you, gentlemen.
MR. HICKS: Thank you, Commissioners. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: That returns us back to our agenda. The next item that we have on the agenda --

COMM. SLASH: Do we need the ALJ back
in, or are we good?
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I don't think we
need the ALJ back in. We just have public
comments and announcements. Well, I think she --
I think she was wanting to be here.
COMM. SLASH: Okay.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Do you want to go
get her?
(Pause in proceedings.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: We are at the point
of announcements and public comment.
(Discussion off the record.)
JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: Are we still
on the record?
COMM. SLASH: Yes.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: We are still on the record.

JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: Okay. So, as
far as announcements, if that's okay --
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Yes.
JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: -- I do have
one announcement. I'll keep it pretty quick.
First, $I$ will e-mail you the ethics training. We
won't keep you for that, if that sounds good. COMM. SLASH: Great.

JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: The second thing is there is a case on which $I$ have a conflict because $I$ was involved in the investigation, so $I$ need to recuse myself from that, and $I$ believe Chair Ramos would be willing to take that on based on the statute. It says where the assigned ALJ cannot adjudicate that case, then the Chair is the first person who would take on that responsibility. So, if the Commission would be willing to put that to a vote, that would help in getting that case started.

COMM. SLASH: So moved.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, do we need to
state the case?
JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: Oh, yes.
Thank you very much. One second here. The case on which I have a conflict is Ledoris Pace versus Porter Regional Hospital, ICRC No. EMral6071322, EEOC No. 24F-2016-0134(b).

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay.

COMM. HARRINGTON: A question in process. You said the first step is the Chair. What is the next step if it wasn't the Chair? JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: So, if Chair

Ramos is unable to serve as the ALJ, the Vice-Chair would be next in line for that, and then if Vice-Chair Slash is unable to do that, then any of the Commissioners could serve in her stead.

COMM. HARRINGTON: Okay. I just want to understand the process. JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: Sure. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, we need a motion to approve the Chair to be the acting ALJ in this particular case that was previously mentioned. I need a motion to approve.

COMM. SLASH: So moved.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I need a second.
COMM. HARRINGTON: Second.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All those in favor of this motion, signify by saying aye.

Comm. Blackburn?
COMM. BLACKBURN: Aye.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Comm. Harrington?
COMM. HARRINGTON: Aye.
CHAIRMAN.RAMOS: Comm. Slash?
COMM. SLASH: Aye.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Aye.
JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: And that's all

I have.
COMM. HARRINGTON: Are the dates specific? So, how do you verify that he's available?

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: We had a
conversation.
JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: So, Chair
Ramos will take over as ALJ and the Docket Clerk, Ms. Eromosele, will serve as his Docket Clerk as well and get everything organized for him so that he'll have access to any and all of our resources, setting up the hearing room for prehearing conferences. She can assist with all of that.

COMM. HARRINGTON: So, they will
coordinate with --
JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: Yes.

COMM. HARRINGTON: Okay. That's -JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: He will take over the case from here on.

COMM. HARRINGTON: Okay.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: It'll be an
interesting process as well. You've done that. COMM. SLASH: I've been there, yes. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: You've been there.

And that's what the role is for, so I'll be happy to step up to that for the cause.

JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: Thank you. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. Any other
announcements?
JUDGE STEPHENS RYKER: Not from me, no.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All right. So,
public comments?
MS. POSEY: Ms. Bland?
MS. BLAND: Yeah. First of all, I
just want to ask you all to forgive me. I didn't mean to raise my voice, but $I$ didn't agree with what you said, because of you didn't get all of the facts and --

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Please identify yourself for the record.

MS. BLAND: Oh, my name is Develan L. Bland, Develan Bland, against Ortho Indy. I gave you my tapes -- I gave you my letter, I gave you my tapes, I told you -- it's in the letter and on my recording about everything that happened, all of the people that I talked to there. I told you the camera's sitting right there on me and my daughter. We was the only African-Americans in there.

Then Angie goes -- I'm talking to the lady. She asked me for my information. I give the lady my information, then this girl named Angie butts in, "I'm not talking to you," and I wouldn't say nothing to her, so she got offended because $I$ wouldn't say nothing to her while she was talking. So, she storms out of there.

The lady sitting -- I can't think of the lady at the desk. She was sitting here.

Security is right there, so if $I$ was doing something out of line, the security guard was right there big as day.

Okay. So, he put his head down, and she put her head down, you know, because Angie had no right to butt in. So, Angie -- so, I wouldn't answer Angie, so Angie gets mad, she storms out of the room like she's two years old, she goes to the back, and I asked the lady that was taking my information, $I$ said, "Where did she go?" And she said, "She went back there to get somebody," some name she said.

So, when he -- and Joanie came out. He just came right in my face and said, "We ain't serving you."
"Why?"
And he said, "We just ain't serving you."
"Why not?"
"We just ain't going to serve you."
"Okay. This is for sprains of ankles.
This is a recorder. You can't turn me away." Plus my doctor sent me there. "You don't have no right to turn me away."

Then after that, here comes -- a Caucasian
comes in pushing her -- he or she is pushing one of -- each other, I don't recall if the man was
pushing the woman or the woman was pushing the man, but they got there dead at almost closing time.

They got seen, and they're going to send me away, me and my daughter? Huh-uh. I came too far for that. And plus, you don't have no right to turn me away. And then they had in the letter something about a shot, a shot. If I said that, you're supposed to have that. I didn't come in there -- I told them $I$ was in a car accident and I hurt my arm. They didn't have no right to turn me away.

And $I$ wasn't trying to be rude or disrespectful to you all anyway, but $I$ know that camera's going to set us free, because I know that camera's going to tell the truth. I'm telling the truth, and they didn't have no right to turn me away.

I talked to Ms. Smith, and I told
Ms. Smith. She even said, "I can't understand why they turned you away." I said, "I don't either." She said, "But did you have surgery on your neck?" I said, "I sure did." She said,
"Well, you know, you've got to go back to your doctor who did the surgery." I said, "I'm fully aware of that, but $I$ didn't come in there for that. I came in there for my arm, and plus, my doctor sent me there."

And then $I$ got there -- I did as you all said, get there before 8:00 o'clock, and me and my daughter did, and spent the whole time -- when we got there, you'll see me standing at the desk talking to the people. I wasn't rude, wasn't disrespectful.

When that lady, Joan -- when Angie stormed out, then the brother took my information, and the security guard said, "Well, you know we've got to ask you questions." I said, "Yeah, I know you do, I'm fully aware of that, but $I$ wasn't talking to her. I'm talking to her. I'm talking to her," the lady that took my information.

This lady's supposed to wait until I get through and take me to the back, then ask me. You just don't run in there and talk to me any kind of way, you know. She just talked to me like $I$ was two years old, and she talked to me
like she was prejudiced, and I didn't appreciate her tone of voice or anything like that.

And as far as the Caucasian people coming in, "You're going to see them and turn me away?" No, no, no. And that's why it was so important that I made that perfectly clear to Ms. Thompson, Ms. Deering. I made it perfectly clear to them. I even told that to Ms. --

MS. POSEY: Simmons?
MS. BLAND: Yeah, Ms. Simmons, and I told that to Fran, you know, because I came straight here, because you all had no -- I came the next day, $I$ was so hot. You know, all that time $I$ went out there and all of the pain I'm in. I'm still going through trouble right now, as of today, with my arm. I went for an MRI yesterday for my arm.

I'm still having problems with this arm, and it's an injury, but $I$ said "fracture." So, I didn't know fracture was a broken arm. I didn't have that. I had an injury, but I'm still in the guidelines; you understand? You don't have no right to turn me away. You just can't come in
the back and go back when somebody tell you and turn me away. You can't do that. You can't do that. And that's wrong.

And that's all $I$ was asking you all to do the last time $I$ was here, get the camera. Just ask for the footage. And then $I$ asked my lawyer about it. He said the only way -- the only one can get the footage is you all, or we go to court. Let's go in front of a judge. MS. POSEY: We asked for the footage,
and they had already -- they don't keep the footage --

MS. BLAND: Oh, yes, she did. She
had the footage.
MS. POSEY: -- for more than 48
hours.
MS. BLAND: Huh-uh, they had the footage. But look, you had plenty of time to get the footage. You had plenty enough time to get it. You had plenty enough time to get that footage. I came the next following day, I was that mad. I called Ms. Simmons the next following day, and $I$ came straight down here.

And plus, we typed it up, me and my -- like I speak it, and my daughter goes to school, and she'll type it up, and --

MS. POSEY: Uh-huh.
MS. BLAND: -- we typed the letter up and we brought it down here. Then we put out the papers and then you all sent me a letter. And then I talked to another gentleman, and he said -- I said, "No, I don't agree with this." He said, "Well, you've got 15 days," and we came the same day.

MS. POSEY: Uh-huh.
MS. BLAND: I'm telling the truth.
You don't have no right to turn me away, and I'd just really appreciate it if you all would get that footage and you'll see that I'm telling the truth, and I pray that you don't take my outburst today of being rude and disrespectful, which I was, but I'm sorry. It's just that $I$ don't agree with it, and I'm going to stand up for what is right.

And that is discrimination, big as day, because me and my daughter was the only

African-Americans in there. Everybody in there was Caucasian, and $I$ don't believe in that. I'm here for the Lord. I don't believe in that, but I believe in righteousness and justice. And they are wrong, and I'm telling you, all you need to do is listen to the recordings, all of the recordings I sent --

MS. POSEY: Uh-huh.
MS. BLAND: -- and read the letter.
I'm telling the truth. Just get the footage. You had plenty enough time to get the footage. You had plenty enough time to get that footage. I'd rather go to court, because $I$ ain't done with this. They ain't getting away with this.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, the burden of proof is to demonstrate that they acted racially discrimin --

MS. BLAND: Yes, they did, sir. Yes, they did.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So that in
evidence -- and I didn't go through -- I read through the highlighted piece of it, but I haven't gone through the whole case. If -- in
many cases, if this particular company serves other denominations, including African-American, others -- I mean generally speaking, you know, in this -- in general, this is -- there's no evidence that they discriminated. I mean if there was only -- if they only handled Caucasian people, that would be clear evidence, but if they support in the documentation that they handle others, and that's particularly part of that. So, it would have to be specific, something that's specifically oriented to you that clearly demonstrated that it was --

MS. BLAND: It was, it was
discrimination. It was discrimination. I mean when $I$ came in there, just looking at me, she looked at me so evil and hateful and mean, you know, and they had no right to turn me away, whenever you get through with it. "You can't turn me away after my doctor done sent me there. Plus $I$ called you, plus I'm in the guidelines with your answering service, with you all helping. You don't have no right to turn me away. And then you're going to turn around and
see them and send us away?" I don't think so. That's wrong.

MS. POSEY: So, you say you have an
attorney?
MS. BLAND: No, I -- no, I talked to an attorney about this.

MS. POSEY: Okay.
MS. BLAND: And he told me to -- he said, "That's the problem. As long as you don't get that footage, they're going to win. It takes them to get the footage." You get that footage --

MS. POSEY: Right.
MS. BLAND: -- then you all make a
decision. But see, you can't -- you can't make no decision when you don't have all of the facts. MS. POSEY: Right. So, unfortunately when we requested the footage, they no longer had the footage.

MS. BLAND: No, but you had plenty enough time to get the footage. That's not my fault.

MS. POSEY: Okay.

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MS. BLAND: You all had plenty enough time to get that footage.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: But the footage
would not --
MS. BLAND: Even Ms. Thomp -- Ms. --
MS. POSEY: Thompson.
MS. BLAND: She had plenty enough
time to get that footage. Ain't no excuse for that.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: So, the --
MS. BLAND: Ain't no excuse for that.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Depending on the --
depending on the type of security -- and I don't know what it is, but $I$ have a business and $I$ have cameras all over the place.

MS. BLAND: You know, that little round one.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Yeah. Well, but it is -- most of them are just video, they're not audio and video, they're just video.

MS. BLAND: But you can --
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And $I$ don't know
particularly what this would be, but if there was
something that was said, then that would be evidence.

MS. BLAND: You can see from the body -- you can see from the body language, you can see that me and my daughter, we're the only ones in there, because they're getting ready to close. We -- they were getting ready to close. Me and my daughter -- from the time I got in there, that's all they did was treated me mean, evil.

Then a man is just going to come out of the blue and just say, "I'm not going to see you," and, you know, didn't have no explanation why you don't want to see me? What? After I done came this far? After I done called you and I'm still in pain? Ms. Thompson, she had plenty enough time -- Ms. Thomas, she had plenty enough time to get that footage.

COMM. HARRINGTON: Regardless of
the --
MS. BLAND: Ain't no excuse for that. COMM. SLASH: There's no footage. MS. BLAND: Oh, yes, there is the
footage, because it's on my --
COMM. HARRINGTON: But that's --
MS. BLAND: -- it's on my answering
service. You listen to my recording. You'll
hear the manager of the place. She's saying -- I would play back the footage. You had plenty enough time to get the footage.

COMM. HARRINGTON: Well, she's just telling you she went to get the footage, and they won't provide it. So, you can --

MS. BLAND: Okay. But see, it took one -- like Mr. -- you. It could have took him to get it. It takes a lawyer -- I mean a judge, with -- somebody big like him could have -- you could have -- ain't no excuse for that. You could have got the footage.

COMM. HARRINGTON: It's not an
excuse, ma'am. I'm just trying to help you hear her fact.

MS. BLAND: No.
COMM. HARRINGTON: Based on today,
there is no footage from the place that --
MS. BLAND: I guess not. Look how
long it took -- look how long -- you should have got it then. Ain't no excuse.

COMM. HARRINGTON: Well, it's not an
excuse, it's a fact at this point, so --
MS. BLAND: No, that's wrong.
COMM. HARRINGTON: -- all we can do
is, based on what's been provided --
MS. BLAND: That's wrong. That's wrong.

COMM. HARRINGTON: -- to us. And so,
the footage, even in --
MS. BLAND: That's wrong.
COMM. HARRINGTON: -- seeing it,
doesn't show racial discrimination.
MS. BLAND: Oh, yes it do. Did you
see it?
COMM. HARRINGTON: No, but listening
to what you said has happened --
MS. BLAND: Oh, no, oh, no, oh, no.
COMM. HARRINGTON: Just because
you're in a room with other people --
MS. BLAND: You can look at -- just
look at the footage. I'm telling you --
COMM. HARRINGTON: There's no
footage.
MS. BLAND: I guess not. Look how long it took you to get it. You should have got it then.
COMM. HARRINGTON: But you keep
telling us to look at something we can't see. We're here to help you --
MS. BLAND: You should have got it
then. Oh, my God.
COMM. HARRINGTON: So --
MS. BLAND: That's not right.
COMM. HARRINGTON: I'm just trying to
help you, and --
MS. BLAND: No, that's not fair.
That's not fair.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: I mean --
MS. BLAND: That is not fair. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: And if they're
truly --
MS. BLAND: It's not fair.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: In their case, if
they're truly individuals that are biased, then
that isn't going to just be evident in one case, it would be -- there would be other situations of that as well, and there aren't any other cases -MS. BLAND: No, that's discrimination.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: -- that have come forward --

MS. BLAND: That's discrimination.
COMM. HARRINGTON: Yeah, other
witnesses would --
MS. BLAND: That's discrimination all
day long. That's discrimination all day long. And Ms. Thompson had a -- she should have got the tape. Ain't no excuse for that. Mrs. Deering, ain't no excuse for that. Ain't no excuse for that. You had plenty enough time to get the tape. Ain't no excuse for that. I'm not going for that. I already --

COMM. HARRINGTON: We've heard --
MS. BLAND: I already specified that, and I told you to get the tape. Ain't no excuse for you all not to get the tape. You all did not take care of this properly. And I'm not
ignorant. I know when I'm right.
COMM. HARRINGTON: No one is saying you're ignorant, but there's nothing the four of us can do.

MS. BLAND: I came down here --

COMM. HARRINGTON: Other than the
facts you bring in --
MS. BLAND: Soon as it happened, I flew down here.

MS. POSEY: Uh-huh.

MS. BLAND: I made that at the last
time. We wrote the letter about everything that happened, then $I$ came straight down here. I called Ms. Simmons. She said, "Yeah, come on down." And I came -- I called before I even came down here so $I$ wouldn't waste my gas.

MS. POSEY: Right.
MS. BLAND: Ain't no excuse for that. Ms. Thompson, ain't no excuse for that.

Ms. Deering, ain't no excuse for that. And every time $I$ call Ms. Deering, she don't never want to answer the phone, she don't want to do nothing; okay?

So, Ms. Thompson didn't want to -- I'm asking her questions about what's going on with my case. You ain't got nothing to say? Next thing you know, "You'll get something in the mail." You didn't handle this right. This is supposed to be for discrimination. This is supposed to be for people like me that's being taken advantage of. This didn't have no right to go in their favor. You all need to open this back up again, or let's go in front of a real judge and let that judge be the judge of it, because you are wrong. It don't have no right to go in their favor. This is not over, by a long shot. This is not over.

MS. POSEY: So, at this point, you can file a case in trial court where -- wherever this happened. If this happened here in Marion County -- I don't know where -MS. BLAND: Yeah, $86 t h$, Ortho Indy. MS. POSEY: -- or township, and you can file a case in state court. But here at the Commission, once they've made -MS. BLAND: That's wrong.

MS. POSEY: -- that final decision, the Commission can't open -- reopen up the case. But now you have all of the evidence, all the information from the Indiana Civil Rights Commission. Have you requested from us your complete file? Because you can request the file.

MS. BLAND: Yeah, I want everything back.

MS. POSEY: You can take everything
and --
MS. BLAND: Yeah, I want everything back.

MS. POSEY: -- take your matter
forward.
Okay. What time is it?
MS. BLAND: Yeah, $I$ want everything back.

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: It's 4:00 o'clock.
MS. POSEY: Okay. We're not going to be able to get it to you today, but we can get it to you --

CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Monday.
MS. POSEY: -- on Monday; okay?

MS. BLAND: I just can't believe every time $I$ come to you guys for help, you never -- you never help. It just always goes to the other -- the people that we go against, they always got to win. And I'm not prejudiced, I don't believe in that, but ortho Indy is wrong. CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Okay. Well, we appreciate you coming down, we appreciate -MS. BLAND: Okay. So, if it don't clear with you all, don't $I$ go to court in here?

MS. POSEY: No, not here.
MS. BLAND: Okay. Do $I$ file against you all, too?

MS. POSEY: If you'd like to.
MS. BLAND: Okay. That's fine.
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: All right. Are
there other public comments?
(No response.)
CHAIRMAN RAMOS: Hearing none, we are adjourned.

-     -         - 

Thereupon, the proceedings of October 18, 2019 were concluded at 4:00 o'clock p.m.





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