May 13, 2005
The Honorable Robert D. Garton
President Pro Tempore
Indiana
State Senate
114th General Assembly
Statehouse
Indianapolis,
Indiana
46204
Dear Senator Garton:
By
the authority vested in me as Governor of Indiana, under the provisions of
Article 5, Section 14, of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, I do hereby veto Senate Enrolled
Act No. 218, enacted during the regular session of the 114th General
Assembly and related to the use of safety belts in vehicles.
I
understand that the initial impetus behind this bill was a desire to address
what some consider to be an unfair and illogical standard in Indiana law related to the use of
seatbelts. Proponents point to the
inconsistency between Indiana’s
requirement of seatbelt use, on the one hand, and the inadmissibility of
evidence of seatbelt nonuse as a means of allocating comparative fault, on the
other. It strikes me that a change
in the law to address this incongruity would be consistent not only with our
Comparative Fault Act but also with Hoosiers’ fundamental notions of
fairness.
Although its origins may have been directed toward this end,
SEA 218 in its final form suffers from a number of flaws from both legal and
policy perspectives and fails, in my opinion, to achieve the goals it was
intended to address. The Act
authorizes, for the first time, the introduction of evidence of seatbelt
nonuse, but it contemplates that such evidence be heard at the damages phase,
as opposed to the fault phase, of a trial.
Such an approach is inconsistent with the logic expressed in the Indiana
Supreme Court’s March 30, 2005 opinion in Kocher v. Getz. There the Court noted that, in comparative
fault cases, conduct by a plaintiff before
an accident that constitutes failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages
is to be considered in determining “fault.” SEA 218 is inconsistent with this view
to the extent that it provides for the admission of evidence only at the “damages”
phase of a trial, after fault has already been determined.
SEA 218 does advance one of its proponents’ original
goals by providing for a reduction in damages based on a plaintiff’s
failure to wear a seatbelt.
However, its utility is undermined by a 4% cap on the amount of that
reduction and by the defendant’s need to overcome significant evidentiary
hurdles—including the need for expert testimony—to prove both
noncompliance and the extent of the reduction of damages.
Another aspect of the bill—the admission of evidence
of a defendant’s drunk driving or other violations of law during the
damages phase of a trial—gives rise to an additional concern. SEA 218 runs counter to the
long-standing practice of allowing a defendant to concede such violations and admit
full liability at the outset, so that the court may proceed directly to a
determination of damages, thus reducing court time and costs.
I note that many of those who would be impacted by this
legislation have not reached consensus.
I will support future efforts to resolve the discrepancy in Indiana law between the
requirement of seatbelt use and the prohibition on the admission of evidence of
seatbelt nonuse at trial, with legislation that enjoys broader support and that
does not suffer from the flaws described in this letter.
Sincerely,
Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.
Governor