Recent CADDNAR Decisions
Shorewood CD & Baker v. Drew (22-041W) 17 CADDNAR 5 (2024)
Shorewood Conservation Development, LLC., and Baker, Petitioners, petitioned the Commission to define the parties’ respective riparian zones and to resolve a dispute involving Respondents Drews’ pier so as to respect Baker’s riparian rights. At the time of the administrative hearing, a quiet title action was pending in the Kosciusko County Superior Court; the parties agreed that the resolution of this dispute would abide by the Court’s ruling regarding the location of the riparian line. Baker argued that Drews had expanded their pier in such a way as to infringe on Baker’s riparian rights. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that both parties must maintain no less than five (5) feet of clear space on their respective sides of the riparian line, creating a total of 10 feet of open, clear, navigable space between the parties’ respective piers kept free of piers, moored watercraft, boatlifts, and other structures. The parties were ordered to adjust their piers, boatlifts, watercraft, and any other objects or lakeward structures to comply with the order and the forthcoming order from the Kosciusko County Superior Court.
Crosby v. Mohlman & Bobay (21-038W) 17 CADDNAR 4 (2024)
The Commission determined that the riparian boundary between the Petitioners and Mohlman is formed by a perpendicular to the shore from the point of intersection of the parties’ respective properties as identified in the retracement survey placed into evidence. The Commission also determined that a safety zone of ten feet be maintained between any piers, watercraft, boat lifts or moored watercraft, with the Petitioners and Mohlman contributing five feet of that space in their respective riparian areas.
Scudder v. DNR (23-043D) 17 CADDNAR 3 (2024)
Petitioner was given a baby racoon to take care of outside of the statutory time period of November to January of the following year. Petitioner had kept and raised the racoon for several months and applied for a wild animal possession permit from the Department of Natura Resources to keep the racoon. The Department denied Petitioner’s application, and Petitioner appealed the denial. The Administrative Law Judge found that, as the Petitioner acquired the racoon outside of the statutory “season” for acquiring racoons and the racoon was not acquired legally as described in administrative rules and Indiana statutes, the Department properly denied the permit application.
Byall v. Diller (23-038W) 17 CADDNAR 2 (2024)
Petitioners alleged that Respondents had placed a boat in Petitioners’ riparian zone, which infringed on Petitoiners’ ability to fully use and enjoy the riparian zone. Petitioners sought to have Respondents move their pier and boat so that neither would infringe on Petitioners’ riparian zone. The property had been split in 1933 and there were disagreements over the boundaries of the riparian zone as well as the landward property lines. The Administrative Law Judge found that the Third Principle of Information Bulletin 56 applied to this case given the relatively straight shoreline; that the Commission could not adjudicate landward property disputes; that both parties had riparian zones approximately 11.5 feet wide; that both parties are to maintain no less than three (3) feet of open, clear space on their side of the dividing riparian line at all times; that each parties’ pier may be no wider than three (3) feet at its widest point; and that any watercraft moored and/or docked at either party’s pier may not cross into or otherwise infringe on the other party’s riparian zone beyond infringement caused by the temporary entry to and exit from their respective riparian zones
Gibson County Coal, LLC v. DNR & Pioneer Oil Company, Inc. (22-069G) 17 CADDNAR 1 (2024)
Gibson County Coal, LLC appealed Coal Bed Methane Permits issued by the Department of Natural Resources to Pioneer Oil Company which would allow Pioneer to produce from an area of coal mining workings over which Gibson County held a permit. The Commission determined that Pioneer Oil’s permit applications complied with all regulatory and statutory requirements; therefore, the Department was required to issue the permits under I.C. ยง 14-37-4-8. Summary judgment was therefore issued in favor of the Department of Natural Resources.
Morton v. Shank (22-027W) 16 CADDNAR 29 (2023)
In this riparian dispute, the Natural Resources Commission determined that the holder of an easement approximately 6.5 feet in width could maintain a pier lakeward of the easement. However, the riparian zone associated with the easement was not sufficiently wide to moor a boat to the pier.
Teska v. DNR (23-026W) 16 CADDNAR 28 (2023)
Petitioners asked the Natural Resources Commission to force the Department of Natural Resources to issue a declaratory judgment determining Petitioners’ riparian area, declaring Petitioners’ exclusive right to use that riparian area, and preventing unknown third parties from mooring watercraft and/or building docks and piers in Petitioners’ riparian area. Part of that declaratory judgment would have been affirming Petitioners’ ownership of the land underneath, and thus the riparian area associated with, Lake Shore Drive in the Petitioners’ subdivision. In a motion for summary judgment, the Department of Natural Resources argued that such a declaration would amount to the Natural Resources Commission issuing an order determining landward property rights, something outside the Commission’s jurisdiction. On review, the Administrative Law Judge granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment and found that 1. The Commission may consider established landward rights, but not create or affirm them without significant documentation, when rendering decisions; and 2. Even if the Commission were to grant Petitioners’ request, Petitioners would essentially gain no relief by the issuing of the declaratory judgment.
City of New Albany v. Ecosystems Connections Institute, LLC & DNR (21-027W) 16 CADDNAR 27 (2023)
This appeal involved a permit issued by the Department to ECI for the removal of a low head dam located in Silver Creek. The Commission granted summary judgment in favor of ECI and the Department, finding the undisputed evidence established that the Department had complied with the requirements of the Flood Control Act in issuing the permit.
Bruick, et al. v. Ohio Consumer Credit, et al. (21-002W) 16 CADDNAR 26 (2023)
Petitioners requested that the Commission review their deeded easement over Respondent’s property and determine what, if any, riparian rights Petitioners were entitled to enjoy. Petitioners argued that they had a prescriptive easement granting riparian rights to place a pier into Snow Lake due to years of continuous placement of a pier on Snow Lake. Respondents argued that the easement was merely a “walking easement,” which granted Petitioners only the right to access Snow Lake without granting the right to build a maintain a pier. The ALJ found that Petitioners did not have a prescriptive easement as they did not satisfy all the requirements listed in Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476 (Ind. 2005), and thus were not entitled to place a pier on the easement into Snow Lake, but that Petitioners did have a “walking easement” granting access to Snow Lake.
Frisinger v. Holderman, et al. (22-060W) 16 CADDNAR 25 (2023)
Petitioners believed that Respondents had placed a pier into Loon Lake that infringed on Petitioners’ riparian zone. Petitioners believed that their riparian line extended out into the middle of Loon Lake. Respondents argued that their pier was fully in their riparian zone as they believed the riparian zone was pie shaped due to both Respondents’ and Petitioners’ properties sitting on a rounded bay. The Administrative Law Judge found that the area in which the parties’ properties are located is a rounded bay and that the riparian zones should be pie-shaped, but also found that an exact determination of those riparian zones could not be determined without a riparian survey. The Administrative Law Judge further ordered that, once the exact riparian boundaries are determined, both parties’ piers must be fully in their respective riparian zones.
West & Wallace v. Leazier (22-061W) 16 CADDNAR 24 (2023)
Petitioners own real property contained within the plat to the North Shore Addition to Tri-Lake Resort Company. Petitioners’ real property does not abut Shriner Lake. However, Petitioners obtained a non-exclusive easement over a 1.87-acre tract of property located between Petitioners’ properties and Shriner Lake. By order of the Steuben County Circuit Court, Petitioners were granted an easement that included the right to a extend a pier into Shriner Lake from the Easement. The court order did not specify a location from which Petitioners could extend their pier. Petitioner West maintained a pier approximately 150 feet from his property line within the easement. He asserted he should be able to extend his pier directly across from his property, where the respondents pier was located. West’s request to order respondents to move respondents’ pier so West could place his pier in that location was denied because the evidence did not show that West had been granted an easement specific to that location.